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The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure
Adrian Vermeulet
The federal Constitution contains a set of rules that I will describe as the constitutionallaw of congressionalprocedure.These are
rules that directly regulate the internal decisionmaking procedures of
Congress;' absent specific constitutional provision, those internal procedures would be subject to the authority of each house to "determine
the Rules of its Proceedings. 2 The constitutional law of congressional
procedure thus encompasses the long catalogue of procedural provisions in Sections 4 and 5 of Article I, which includes rules for assembling the legislature, selecting its officers, and disciplining its members;
voting and quorum rules; rules governing the transparency of deliberation and voting; and a range of other provisions. It also encompasses other important rules scattered elsewhere in Articles I and II,

such as the Origination Clause,' special quorum rules for supermajority voting,' and the procedures for overriding a presidential veto.' But
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to Louis Fisher, Barry Friedman,
Elizabeth Garrett, Jacob Gersen, Larry Kramer, Daryl Levinson, Lawrence Sager, Lior StrahilevCass Sunstein, Charles Ttefer, Seth Tillman, Mark Tushnet, and workshop participants at
itz,
Georgetown, New York University, and the University of Texas law schools for helpful comments. Thanks to Eric Truett for excellent research assistance, and to the Russell J.Parsons Fund
for financial support. Special thanks to Yun Soo Vermeule.
I The qualifier serves to exclude provisions that incidentally affect congressional procedure as a byproduct of other aims, as when the First Amendment right of free speech is interpreted to restrict the scope of congressional investigations. See, for example, Watkins v United
States, 354 US 178, 196-97 (1957) (holding, in the context of a witness's refusal to testify before a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, that [t]he First Amendment
may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms by law or by lawmaking").
US Const Art 1.§ 5, cl2.
2
3
US Const Art I, § 7, cl I ("All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.").
4
US Const Art II, § 1, cl3 (requiring that when the House is selecting a president because
no candidate received a majority of ballots in the Electoral College, "a Member or Members
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I shall exclude questions about the structure and composition of Congress-questions such as the choice between bicameralism and unicameralism, or the standing qualifications for federal legislative office.
Drawing this boundary has both methodological and substantive justifications. Methodologically, it is impossible to talk fruitfully about the
design of constitutional rules if everything is up for grabs all at once;
there must be fixed points from which the analysis may proceed. Substantively, the composition and structure of Congress fall outside the

houses' internal rulemaking powers, so they do not bear directly on
the Constitution's choice to prescribe some procedural rules while
leaving others to legislative discretion.
The constitutional law of congressional procedure has rarely been
analyzed as an integrated body of rules,6 largely because of historical

quirks in the relevant sectors of political science and constitutional
law. Political scientists have made the crucial point that Congress's internal procedures are at least as important a determinant of policy
outcomes and of the quality of legislative deliberation as are electoral
rules, substantive legislative powers, and other subjects studied exhaustively by constitutional lawyers.7 The central tendency in recent
political science scholarship on Congress, however, has been to assume that all legislative procedure is endogenous, subject to alteration

by sufficiently determined legislative majorities wielding internal
rulemaking power.' Against this picture, I will emphasize the rich and
from two thirds of the States" must be present to constitute a quorum and a majority of states
must then agree on a president).
5
US Const Art I, § 7, cl2-3 (requiring two-thirds of the members of both houses to override a presidential veto).
6
Specific topics discussed in the literature include voting rules, especially supermajority
rules. See, for example, John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, 80 Tex L Rev 703 (2002). Another strain of public-law scholarship concerns the
"due process of lawmaking." See, for example, Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55
Neb L Rev 197 (1976). This work unfortunately tends to entangle itself in questions about how
courts should conduct judicial review, and whether such review might be used to improve congressional performance. See, for example, William W. Buzbee and Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative
Record Review, 54 Stan L Rev 87 (2001). My project here is to move decisively away from this
court-centered discourse, instead analyzing the subject from the standpoint of constitutional
design.
7
See Gary W. Cox, On the Effects of Legislative Rules, in Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill
Squire, and D. Roderick Kiewiet, eds, Legislatures: Comparative Perspectives on Representative
Assemblies 247,251-64 (Michigan 2002).
8 See, for example, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making tinder Separate Powers 164 (Cambridge 1999)
(treating legislative organization and "the types of procedures invoked in passing legislation" as
a "collective choice process" that results in laws); Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative
Organization77-79 (Michigan 1991) (treating the legislature's membership, including members'
varied interests and expertise, as exogenously fixed, but treating "organizational design," including committee composition and distribution of legislative resources, as an endogenous product of
legislative choice); Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of
Congress;or, Why Legislatures,Like Firms,Are Not Organizedas Markets, 96 J Pol Econ 132, 134
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varied body of internal legislative rules that the Constitution imposes

directly, rather than delegating to future legislatures to prescribe. The
interaction between these rules and the endogenously chosen rules
studied by political scientists makes the constitutional design of the

legislative process an essential topic in politics. Legal scholarship, with
honorable exceptions,' has largely neglected internal legislative rules.'

Here the political scientists' emphasis on the importance of legislative
procedure is a valuable corrective-one that I shall adopt and expand.
My project is to examine this body of rules as a unified topic that
is central to the constitutional design of legislative institutions. The

project is neither positive nor radically normative, but instead instrumental and prescriptive. I shall ask whether and how the Constitu-

tion's rules of congressional procedure might be structured to promote a congeries of widely shared aims: the relevant rules should,

among other things, promote well-informed and cognitively undistorted congressional deliberation, should minimize the principal-agent
problems inherent in legislative representation, and should encourage
technically efficient use of constrained legislative resources, especially
time. As we shall see, these aims were in large part also the framers'

aims, or at least their professed ones. But the means that the framers
chose to attain these aims, and the tradeoffs they struck, however

enlightened or technically impressive at the time, have in some respects aged poorly in light of the subsequent two centuries' worth of
theoretical developments, experimentation, and innovation in other
(1988) (treating "legislative institutions" as endogenous products of legislators' goals and
transaction costs). For important exceptions, see, for example. Cox, Effects of Legislative Rules at
248, 264 n 1 (cited in note 7) (distinguishing exogenous rules requiring approval of nonlegislative actors to change, including those fixed by the Constitution, from endogenous rules
subject to congressional alteration): John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes. and Bernard Manin. eds,
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation 131. 138-39 (Cambridge 1999) (analyzing the
Journal Clause in light of principal-agent models); James R. Rogers, Bicameral Sequence: Theory
and State Legislative Evidence, 42 Am J Pol Sci 1025 (1998) (providing a formal model of the
Origination Clause). A great deal of formal modeling in political science assumes various legislative procedures to be exogenously fixed, but this is strictly a methodological simplification to obtain mathematical tractability. Such work typically ignores the difference between (1) modeling
stipulations that particular procedural rules are exogenously fixed and (2) fixation by virtue of
constitutional command.
9 See, for example, Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the
Federal Budget Process, 35 Harv J on Legis 387,397-401.406-32 (1998) (postulating a functionalist revision of Congress's current budget process). For links between legislative procedure and
congressional constitutional interpretation, see Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule. Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress,50 Duke L J 1277,1277,1303-30 (2001).
1) For a typical statement of the assumption I mean to explode, see, for example. Jonathan
R. Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 Va L Rev 471,511 (1988) ("The Constitution ...vests legislative power in a Senate and a House of Representatives, but does not stipulate any of the details
concerning the day-to-day lawmaking procedures to be used within these legislative bodies.").
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jurisdictions. This is not to say, however, that the framers' views are irrelevant to the instrumental project of constitutional design and reform; far from it. If we wish to evaluate and improve the constitutional
design in this area or any other, the ideas, arguments, and pragmatic
solutions that our own constitutional designers developed are a rich
source of useful information, and one that I will draw upon throughout.
I shall also draw upon two bodies of material typically neglected
in modern treatments. The first is a rich utilitarian tradition of theorizing about the optimal design of legislative procedures, especially Jeremy Bentham's great monograph, Political Tactics." The second is
comparative constitutional law, including state and foreign constitutions that contain a wealth of design possibilities and ingenious rules
for minimizing legislative pathologies. To be sure, these sources of information and instrumental analysis often do not generate sharp deductive arguments with confident conclusions. There are too many design possibilities, too many margins on which tradeoffs must be made,
and the fog of empirical uncertainty is too thick. The payoff, rather, is
a horizontal study that links related design problems, analyzes their interaction, and supports plausible recommendations for improvement.
Part I surveys the methodological problems that constitutional
framers designing legislative procedures must confront. One key problem is whether rules on particular subjects should be promulgated in
the constitution itself, or should instead be committed to the discretion of future legislatures through a general grant of rulemaking
power. Constitutional framers may, and our framers did, make this decision on any of several different grounds, including the idea that a
constitution should provide rules on subjects that a legislature is logically incapable of deciding for itself (such as the time of its first assembling); the more pragmatic idea that the framers should choose
the rules on subjects as to which they possess a comparative advantage, cognitive or motivational, over later legislators; and, most pragmatic of all, the need to ensure that a proposed constitution would be
politically acceptable to ratifiers and the people. Another problem is
the following: given a decision to proceed through constitutional rules
rather than by delegation to future legislatures, and given the constraints of severely limited time, information, and political capital under which constitutional framers operate, how should the framers
II Jeremy Bentham. Political Tactics (Clarendon 1999) (M. James. C. Blamires. and C.
Pease-Watkin. eds). I am indebted to Jon Elster for bringing this work to my attention through
his ongoing work on constitutional conventions. A bibliographic note: Political Tactics is in fact a
composite of text by Bentham and Etienne Dumont. See Jon Elster, Don't Burn Your Bridge before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment. 81 Tex L Rev 1751,
1773 n 75 (2003). For brevity, I shall simply refer to the work's implied author as "Bentham."
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choose the content of the rules? Here a major difficulty is whether
framers should simply copy or adopt provisions from the constitutions
of other jurisdictions, without independent inquiry into the provisions'
underlying mechanisms or political rationales, or should instead attempt a thoroughly independent inquiry into optimal design. Both of
these polar views, as well as intermediate views of greater or lesser
coherence, were represented at the federal Constitutional Convention.
Part II turns from method to substance. After introducing the major analytic themes, I shall consider in turn the timing of congressional
sessions, the admission and expulsion of legislators, the selection of
legislative officers, voting and quorum rules, the publicity or transparency of legislative deliberation and voting, the rule barring the Senate
from originating revenue bills, and the question whether Congress
may enact binding statutes that prescribe internal rules for the two
houses taken separately. I will also consider provisions that are surprisingly absent from the federal Constitution -rules of legislative
procedure that appear in state and foreign constitutions, and whose
absence from our own Constitution poses interesting puzzles. Examples include rules requiring three readings before a bill may be enacted, and rules that bar the introduction or enactment of bills at the
close of the legislative session. Throughout Part II, my aim is to identify design defects, to evaluate valuable alternatives and innovations
found in state and foreign constitutions, and to propose interpretive
choices and constitutional reforms that might improve the constitutional law of congressional procedure.
I. DESIGNING CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES

In this Part, I will examine the design of constitutional rules of
legislative procedure, with a view to the methodological problems that
the framers encountered and debated. In Part I.A, the question is why
any rules of congressional procedure should be constitutionalized;
why not simply leave all internal procedures to the discretion of future
legislatures? Part I.B poses the next question: given a decision to constitutionalize a rule or set of rules on a given subject, how should constitutional framers choose the content of those rules-by imitation of
other constitutions, by independent ratiocination about optimal design, or by some mix of these strategies?
A. Why Constitutionalize Congressional Procedure?
Why should any rules of congressional procedure be constitutionalized? Constitutions almost invariably grant some measure of
discretionary power over internal rules to the legislatures created by
the constitution. The federal Constitution's Rules of Proceedings
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Clause,'2 which gives each house separately the power to enact internal procedural rules," is, in effect, a delegation of rule-designing authority from constitutional framers in the initial period to legislators
in subsequent periods. Given the baseline established by this constitutional delegation, the puzzle is why framers might want to select some
rules to be elevated to a higher status in the legal hierarchy, and so
made immune from alteration by ordinary legislative rulemaking.
At some risk of false precision, we can identify three (classes of)
reasons to constitutionalize rules of legislative procedure. First, some
procedural rules are logically impossible for a future legislature to
create, at least as an initial matter; consider the question of where and
when the legislature shall initially convene, a question that the legislature could not resolve without convening. Constitutionalizing such
rules can eliminate the need for a future legislature to pull itself up by
its own bootstraps" and resolves coordination problems. Second, there
are rules that a future legislature has the capacity to create, but as to
which the framers have, or believe themselves to have, a comparative
advantage over the future legislators who would otherwise choose the
rule; the framers' (perceived) comparative advantage might stem from
superior information, cognition, or motivation. Finally, constitutionalizing some rules of legislative procedure may, for political reasons, improve a new constitution's chances of ratification by accommodating
the preferences of the ratifying legislatures or conventions. It is tempting to think that this reason is in a sense disreputable compared with
the first two, but the question whether framers should consider or ignore the political acceptability of their proposals turns out to be complicated; it is not at all clear that downstream ratifiers of the framers'
proposed constitution are better off if framers make no effort to anticipate the ratifiers' political preferences.

12 US Const Art I, § 5, cl2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.").
13 On the question whether a statute can override the internal rules of each
house, see
Part II.C.7.
14 This idea is Jon Elster's, developed from his analysis of constitutional conventions. Jon
Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Paris and Philadelphia,14 Cardozo L Rev 549. 549. 55860 (1993) (defining "constitutional bootstrapping" as "the process by which a constituent assembly severs its ties with the authorities that have called it into being and arrogates some or all of
their powers to itself" and noting that some decisions of a constitution-making body must flow
from an external authority because the body cannot itself decide when to meet or how to select
its members): Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargainingin Two ConstituentAssemblies. 2 U Pa J Const
L 345. 358-59 (2000) (noting that a constitution-making assembly must be convoked and a process for selecting delegates must be adopted. but that both of those decisions must be taken from
outside sources, which in the case of the Constitutional Convention was the Continental Congress). My argument is that legislatures created by constitutional convention face a parallel
problem.
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1. Bootstrapping and coordination problems.
Institutions are systems of rules. Where, as is often the case, an institution also possesses the second-order authority to make rules governing its own action, how will those second-order rules be chosen? If
the initial question, for example, is whether the institution's members
will proceed by simple majority vote, an infinite regress threatens: is
the first-order decision itself to be made by majority vote, or under
some other voting rule? And what voting rule is to be used to make
the second-order decision? Absent some higher source of law that
blocks the regress, the conceptual problem is insoluble.
More precisely, the conceptual problem is insoluble in conceptual
terms, but crudely pragmatic solutions exist. Faced with a regress
problem, one expedient solution is for institutions simply to bootstrap
themselves into existence. An example is the Philadelphia Convention
itself: because no outside institution had specified the voting rules the
delegates would use, the delegates simply decided to proceed by simple majority vote (of state delegations, not of individuals). In this example, bootstrapping succeeded because the underlying decision was
largely uncontroversial.5 Although the Convention's decision lacked
coherent conceptual foundations, in fine pragmatic style the decision
worked even without coherent foundations.
Bootstrapping of this sort, however, can rectify the infinite regress problem only when the members of the institution are already
assembled. But a new institution may also face a separate coordination problem in convening at all. Consider the question of when the
first Congress elected under the new federal Constitution should convene -a decision that the new Congress itself could not possibly make.
A pragmatic solution to this sort of problem is for an institution under
the previous, outgoing constitution to specify a focal point on which
the new legislature can coordinate. Thus the outgoing Confederation
Congress specified that the new Congress would meet on March 4,
1789-a decision of dubious legality, given that the Confederation
Congress lacked any obvious authority to make it, but also a decision
that went unquestioned in practice.
15 The Convention's voting rule was derived from the practice under the Articles of
Confederation, with no alternative rule receiving serious consideration. See Elster, 2 U Pa J
Const L at 367-69 (cited in note 14) ("Voting in the Convention was by majority vote, each state
having one vote. Although the Pennsylvanians wanted to refuse the smaller states an equal vote,
their proposal was never put on the table.").
The larger point is that internal rules for deliberative bodies (constitutional conventions or
legislatures) are never chosen in a historical and institutional vacuum. They are always chosen
against the background, not only of exogenous constraints (constitutional or political), but also
of previous rules, traditions, and practices. For an argument to this effect in the congressional setting, see Sarah A. Binder, Minority Rights, Majority Rule: Partisanship and the Development of
Congress 13-15 (Cambridge 1997).
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So infinite regress and coordination problems are not fatal in
practical terms. This does not mean, however, that constitutional
framers should ignore them. That an institution has bootstrapped itself
into existence, either in whole or in part, may provide future opponents or critics with grounds to question the institution's legitimacy.
Constitutional framers may therefore wish to provide rules that obviate the need for new legislatures, convened under the new constitution, to bootstrap rules into place. Likewise, constitutional framers
may easily resolve coordination problems by supplying constitutionally established focal points, which the new legislature may alter once
the machinery of lawmaking is up and running.
These concerns were much in evidence at the Philadelphia Convention; in particular, they animated the Convention's decision to
adopt the provision that "[t]he Congress shall assemble at least once
in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day."' " One obvious coordination problem solved by this provision is the timing of the
first meeting of the new Congress. As John Randolph put it, "some
precise time must be fixed, until the Legislature shall make provision."" A second and distinct coordination problem involved the question whether Congress should meet at all in any given year. Unlike the
first problem, this question applied not only to the initial meeting of
the new Congress but to every subsequent meeting, because some of
the Convention delegates suggested that the legislature could meet
episodically, only when the public business required it. A political response to this argument was that regular meetings should be mandated to provide a check on the executive branch." A different, and
devastating, response was given by Oliver Ellsworth: "The Legislature
will not know till they are met whether the public interest required
their meeting or not."''
The Convention, however, failed to anticipate other bootstrapping and coordination problems that afflicted the first Congress. One
example involved the initial formation of a legislative quorum.
16 US Const Art I,§ 4,cl2. The date specified in this provision has been superseded by the
Twentieth Amendment, which provides: "The Congress shall assemble at least once in every
year. and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day." US Const Amend XX,§ 2.
17 Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner. eds, 2 The Founders' Constitution 283 (Chicago
1987). The date supplied in Article I would have fallen in December 1789, thus contradicting the
date (March 4, 1789) supplied by the Confederation Congress-another reason to question the
legality of the latter provision.
18 One Convention delegate. Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts. "thought it necessary
that there should be one meeting at least every year as a check on the Executive department":
another. Roger Sherman of Connecticut. described frequent legislative meetings as "an essential
safeguard of liberty." Id.
19 Max Farrand.ed.2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 198.200 (Yale 1966).
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Article I provides that "a Majority of each [house] shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day
to day, and may be authorized [that is, by the rules of either house] to
compel the Attendance of absent Members."2 ' The second part of the
provision was inserted to ensure that the absence of a quorum would
not prevent either house from compelling the attendance of absentees.
But the framers failed to anticipate that the initialconvening of Congress might fail for lack of a quorum, as in fact it did in both the
House and Senate. In those circumstances the provision for compelling absentees could not be invoked, since neither house had ever met
to provide compulsion authority to a number smaller than the required quorum. The House soon attained a quorum, but the Senate
limped along, sending stern but toothless letters to absent members,
until it finally convened on April 6, 1789, over a month after the assembly date.'
Another, far more consequential example is the one with which
we began: the framers failed to fully specify the voting rules that
would govern the new legislature. Although the framers specified supermajority rules to govern particular decisions, they failed to specify
whether simple majority voting is a mandatory default rule in areas
not governed by a supermajority provision, or instead whether the internal rules of each house may require supermajorities for particular
decisions. In the latter case, the infinite regress problem reappears:
why should the decision to institute a supermajority requirement in a
particular area not itself be required to be made by supermajority?
The Congress, however, like the Convention before it, has ignored the
conceptual conundrum by assuming that simple majority voting is always the default setting, even for rules creating supermajority
requirements.
2. Comparative advantage.
Another reason to constitutionalize rules of congressional procedure is that constitutional framers have some form of comparative advantage over later legislators in designing those rules. The framers'
comparative advantage might take any of several forms: informational, cognitive, or motivational.The framers might possess superior
information relevant to the design problem, might enjoy freedom
from various cognitive quirks or disabilities that afflict the work of

USConstArt I.§5,cl 1.
Linda Grant De Pauw. Charlene Bangs Bickford, and LaVonne Marlene Siegel, eds. 1
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress, 1789-1791 3-6 (Johns Hopkins 1972) (recounting the Senate's actions pending a quorum and reprinting the letters sent to absent
members).
20

21
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later legislators, or might act from public-spirited reasons where later
legislators would act on the basis of rational self-interest or irrational
passions.
For two reasons, however, the possibility that framers will possess
informational advantages over later legislators seems quite implausible. The first reason is Bentham's view that later generations always
possess informational advantages over earlier ones, simply by virtue of
knowing what has transpired since the earlier generation left the
scene.22 Conversely, a stock theme of constitutional choice is that
framers act behind a "veil of ignorance"-more precisely a veil of uncertainty-that forces them to act impartially.2" The cost of this relative
impartiality, though, is that the framers act in ignorance of postenactment developments that might provide useful information in the
choice of legislative procedures. 4 The second reason to doubt the
framers' purported informational advantage is the relatively larger
size of later congresses as compared to the Convention. As James
Madison argued, increasing the number of legislators increases the
legislature's stock of political information."5 This second reason is specific to the American experience; it does not hold where, as in some
nations, the constituent assembly that designs the constitution also
functions as an ordinary legislature under the constitution.
Perhaps for these reasons, no one at the Philadelphia Convention
suggested that the framers' information would be superior to that of
later Congresses. At most they suggested that the framers' information was equally good, and then only with respect to the sort of coordinating rules that can be settled equally well one way or the other, so
long as they are settled. Thus Oliver Ellsworth argued that the Convention might as well fix the date on which the Congress should annu22 Jeremy Bentham, The Handbook of Political Fallacies 43-53 (Harper & Bros 1962) (H.
Larrabee, ed).
23
See Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L J 399,
399 (2001) ("A veil of ignorance rule ...is a rule that suppresses self-interested behavior on the
part of decisionmakers ... by subjecting the decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution
of benefits and burdens that will result from a decision.").
24 On the general tradeoff between information and impartiality, see Saul Levmore, Efficiency and Conspiracy: Conflicts of Interest, Anti-nepotism Rules, and Separation Strategies, 66
Fordham L Rev 2099 (1998). On the connections between partisan activity and legislative procedure, see Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-inGovernment. 100 Colum L Rev 702 (2000).
25
Federalist 56 (Madison), in The Federalist 378, 380 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke,
ed):
The representatives of each state will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of
its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts; but will probably in all cases
have been members, and may even at the very time be members of the state legislature,
where all the local information and interests of the state are assembled, and from whence
they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into the legislature of the United States.
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ally convene, because "the Convention could judge of it as well as the
Legislature."'6 In such cases, the content of the rule is secondary to the
sheer coordination benefit of choosing a rule; the informational advantage of later legislators is therefore irrelevant to the design problem.
The framers did frequently suggest, however, that they possessed
cognitive and motivational advantages over later legislators. In contemporary terminology, the framers assumed that future legislators
would act on the basis of "interests" and "passions" that would skew
their judgment of the public good or cause them knowingly to act
against the public good for private benefit. And legislators' tendency
to clump into "factions" would exacerbate these cognitive and motivational deficiencies. An example involves the question whether future
legislators should be allowed to expel by a simple majority or only by
a supermajority. Madison argued for the latter position on the ground
that "the right of expulsion was too important to be exercised by a
bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be
dangerously abused."" Gouvernor Morris opposed this, although with
an argument that shared Madison's premise: "This power [of expulsion] may be safely trusted to a majority. To require more may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men from factious mo2
tives may keep in a member who ought to be expelled. The disagreement here is over the expected frequency and gravity of false
positives (expulsion of members who should not be expelled) and
false negatives (the failure to expel members who should be expelled).
Madison's supermajority position seeks to minimize false positives,
while Morris's position in favor of a simple majority requirement
seeks to minimize false negatives. Both views, however, share the assumption that the respective errors will occur because legislators act
on private-regarding or factional motivations.
This example is typical of the debates in an important respect.
The Convention participants rarely questioned the assumption of
comparative cognitive and motivational advantage. Rather, the most
frequently heard grounds for opposing the constitutionalization of
legislative procedures were that the collateral costs of some proposed
safeguard would outweigh the benefits, or that other institutional
Kurland and Lerner, eds, 2 Founders' Constitution at 283 (cited in note 17). See also Far26
rand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 200 (cited in note 19) (reporting Ellsworth's insistence that the
meeting date for Congress not be in the summer because "almost all of the probable members of
the Legislature [are] more or less connected with agriculture"). While the Convention set a date.
Edmund Randolph had the phrase "unless a different day shall be appointed by law" appended
so that a constitutional amendment would not be necessary to change the date. Kurland and
Lerner, eds, 2 Founders' Constitution at 283.
27 Farrand, ed. 2 Federal Convention at 254 (cited in note 19).
Id.
28
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structures and procedures that the framers had adopted rendered unnecessary the additional safeguard of constitutionalizing legislative
procedures. Gouvernor Morris's argument about expulsion is an example of the former claim.
An important example of the latter claim involved the debates
over the Journal Clause. 9 Many participants desired to constitutionalize some version of a requirement that Congress publicize its deliberations and votes. Although the framers realized that transparency might
distort deliberation-the Convention itself deliberated and voted se-

cretly, partly in order to allow participants to change their minds without incurring a reputational penalty in the nation at large"- many
delegates believed that future legislators could not be trusted to weigh

the costs and benefits of transparency in public-regarding fashion." As
George Mason summarized the point (at the Virginia ratifying convention, although similar arguments were made at Philadelphia), "[the
legislators] may conceal what they please. Instead of giving information, they will produce suspicion. You cannot discover the advocates of
their iniquitous acts.""
Against this view was the claim that regular elections would force
legislators to publicize their actions. As Ellsworth put it, "[t]he Legislature will not fail to publish their proceedings from time to timeThe people will call for it if it should be improperly omitted.""9 The

precise electoral mechanism that Ellsworth envisioned here is unclear.
One possibility is that voters demand transparency because it reduces
29

US Const Art I. § 5.cl 3:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same.
excerpting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of
the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.
30 Max Farrand, ed. 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 479 (Yale 1966)
(remarks of Madison):
Had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no
man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument.
The Convention sessions were secret, though a journal was kept. When the Convention adjourned, the secretary, William Jackson, destroyed loose scraps of paper, "which he evidently
thought unimportant'" and turned over the journals and other papers to George Washington,
who subsequently gave the papers to the Department of State in 1796. Max Farrand, ed, I The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 xi-xii (Yale 1966). Congress by joint resolution ordered them published in 1818. Id.
31 Kurland and Lerner,eds 2 Founders' Constitution at 290-91 (cited in note 17).
32
Id at 293. Mason preferred the Journal Clause in the Articles of Confederation. which
read "that congress shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly. except such parts
thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy."
Id.
33
Farranded,2 Federal Convention at 260 (cited in note 19).
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the costs of monitoring their elected agents. Legislators competing
against each other and against potential candidates for voters' confidence might be responsive to that demand even if each legislator
would prefer less transparency than voters would. Here secrecy might
be viewed, from the standpoint of the whole group of legislators, as an
unattainable public good. If all legislative action were secret, no particular legislator could be blamed for the practice. But if each legislator has the option to disclose deliberations or votes, and if such disclosures are verifiable when made, then legislators may defect from the
cooperative behavior of maintaining secrecy to better their position
vis-A-vis other legislators or potential challengers, even if all legislators
would be better off with secrecy.
To be sure, this mechanism assumes that voters care about transparency. Voters might simply use decision rules that are entirely insensitive to legislative procedures. Consider the possibility that voters
vote retrospectively in a simpleminded fashion, asking only whether
their personal economic position is better (in absolute or relative
terms) at the time of election than it was at the time of the previous
election. 4 We will see below, however, that a principal-agent model,
representing legislators as agents who offer ever-greater transparency
to compete for the favor of voter-principals, captures useful truths
about both the Journal Clause and subsequent developments in congressional procedure." Whatever the details of the implicit model,
however, Ellsworth's argument supposes that constitutionalizing a
transparency requirement is unnecessary, given that the institutional
safeguard of regular elections is already in place.
3. Political acceptability.
A final ground for constitutionalizing procedural rules was often
invoked in the Convention debates: the ratifiers-or the people generally-would not find the proposed Constitution politically acceptable without certain procedural rules. This theme was especially
prominent in the debates over the Journal Clause and the Origination
Clause. As to the former, James Wilson argued that, apart from the
merits of the Clause, "as this is a clause in the existing [Articles of
Confederation], the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of
the reform with a pretext by which weak & suspicious minds may be
easily misled." As to the latter, Elbridge Gerry argued that the peoFor an overview of the large literature on retrospective voting, see D. Roderick Kiewiet
and Douglas Rivers, A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting. 6 Pol Behav 369 (1984).
35 See Ferejohn. Accountability and Authority at 139 (cited in note 8) (noting. for example.
that recorded teller voting increased attendance at roll call votes).
Farrand. ed,2 Federal Convention at 260 (cited in note 19). George Mason also "thought
36
it would give a just alarm to the people, to make a conclave of their Legislature." Id.
34
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pie "will not agree that any but their immediate representatives [in the
House of Representatives] shall meddle with their purses. In short the
acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from originating Money bills."" This external political constraint should be distinguished from a different political constraint internal to the Convention: the need to ensure that the proposed draft
was politically acceptable to a majority of state delegations. Obviously
there are close linkages between the two constraints, because delegates might, and frequently did, shape their internal positions by anticipating the reactions and preferences of downstream ratifiers.
A tempting reaction to the external constraint is that it is undesirable for constitutional framers to consider the political preferences
of downstream ratifiers. After all, if the framers' politics-independent
view of optimal design is correct, then to modify that design on political grounds is to propose a suboptimal constitution. Many framers saw
their own political predictions in this light; they believed that the ratifiers' or, especially, the people's political preferences derived from irrational fears of aristocratic conspiracy, fears that opponents of the
new Constitution could exploit. This is the thrust of Wilson's reference
to "weak & suspicious minds [who] may be easily misled,"'' and of
John Dickinson's argument, in the debates over the Origination
Clause, that
all the prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing
this exclusive privilege to the [House of Representatives] and
these prejudices [should] never be disregarded by us when no essential purpose was to be served. When this plan goes forth, it
will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy will be the
watchword; the Shibboleth among its adversaries."
Dickinson's argument, like Wilson's, assumes that the framers
possess privileged insight into optimal constitutional design. The argument that the framers should ignore political considerations is not,
however, dependent upon this assumption. Whether or not the framers' independent view of optimal design is correct, the ratifiers might
believe that the best division of labor is for the framers to leave all political considerations to the ratifiers themselves, just as a legislator
might desire staff technocrats to consider only matters of optimal policy design, leaving considerations of political acceptability to the expertise of professional politicians. Moreover, if ratifiers' political preferences can themselves be shaped, at least in part, by the framers'
proposals, the framers need not attempt to anticipate the ratifiers'
37
38

39

Id at 275.
Id at 260.
Id at 278.
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preferences, for those preferences will be, in whole or in part, products
of the framers' actions, rather than constraints on their actions.
Yet there are also public-spirited reasons for constitutional framers to consider politics, and even for ratifiers to consider themselves
better off if framers do so. The circumstances under which constitution-making typically occurs entail that the framers' relationship to
ratifiers is fundamentally unlike the relationship of policy analysts to
decisionmakers. Constitutional framing typically occurs under conditions of perceived political crisis, given the breakdown of the old constitutional order, and under a constraint of urgency, given the need to
coordinate upon a new constitutional order. If framing and ratification
must be completed under severe time constraints, ratifiers will be better off if framers attempt to anticipate their political preferences. The
option to reject an initial, politically insensitive proposal and to send
the framers back to the drawing board will often be practically infeasible. In these circumstances ratifiers will be worse off if they are constrained to accept a proposal that is marginally better than total failure of the constitution-making process, yet worse than any alternative
design that takes their preferences into account.
B.

Reason or Experience?

Given a decision to constitutionalize rules of legislative procedure, another critical methodological question for constitutional designers is whether to adopt rules from other jurisdictions without independent inquiry into their institutional and political rationales, or
instead to attempt a thoroughly independent assessment of optimal
design, including sophisticated predictions about the interaction effects between provisions. In the framers' philosophical argot, this was
the opposition between "reason" and "experience": the defining difference turns on whether the proponent who urges adoption of a particular rule conducts a full independent inquiry into the institutional
and political mechanisms that cause the rule to produce the desired
effects or instead eschews a full understanding of the relevant political
forces. The latter approach amounts to a deliberate policy of adoption;
the only question the adopter asks is whether the rule at issue has
proven "workable," in some roughly pragmatic sense, in the polity
from whose constitution the rule is to be adopted.
The Convention debates over the Origination Clause provide
many examples of both approaches, because the principal argument
for the Clause was that the delegates should imitate the firm rule of
English law that money bills could only be originated in the House of
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Commons.' As for ambitiously rationalist constitutional design, an example is Madison's initial sally against adopting the Clause:
[Madison] observed that the Commentators on the [British
constitution] had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction
on the [House of Lords] in money bills. Certain it was there could
be no similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be

the representatives of the people as well as the 1st branch [the
House of Representatives]. If they [should] have any dangerous
influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of
the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed.'
By contrast, a particularly pure example of the experiential, antirationalist stance is John Dickinson's famous speech urging the Philadelphia delegates to adopt the Clause:
Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us. It
was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable
mechanism of the English Constitution. It was not Reason that
discovered or ever could have discovered the odd & in the eye of
those who are governed by reason, the absurd mode of trial by
Jury. Accidents probably produced these discoveries, and experience has give[n] a sanction to them. This is then our guide. And
has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills
to the immediate representatives of the people. Whence the effect
may have proceeded he could not say; whether from the respect

with which this privilege inspired the other branches of [Government] to the H[ouse] of Commons, or from the turn of thinking it gave to the people at large with regard to their rights, but
42
the effect was visible & could not be doubted.

The choice between independent inquiry ("reason") and adoption ("experience") superficially resembles the standard distinction, in
the literature on comparative constitutionalism, between interjurisdictional borrowing or copying, on the one hand, and innovation, on the
other. The two approaches, however, are merely overlapping, not coterminous. The rationalist and optimizing constitutional designer may
"borrow" from other jurisdictions in the sense that he consults other
jurisdictions' constitutions to obtain ideas and possibilities; the designer then treats those ideas as options within the design space, to be
assessed against other options in the optimizing calculus. Note also
Farrand, ed, 1 Federal Convention at 233 (cited in note 30).
Id (emphasis added). Madison went on to argue. "As the Senate would be generally a
more capable sett of men, it [would] be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business. especially of that which was most important." Id.
42
Farrand, ed. 2 Federal Convention at 278 (cited in note 19) (emphases added).
40

41
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that adoption may draw upon unwritten as well as written constitutions, so long as the content of unwritten practices is sufficiently clear.
Many American framers urged adoption of the unwritten practices of
English constitutionalism, as in Dickinson's argument. It was also true,
contrary to a common assumption, that the framers had many written
constitutions on which to draw. Circulating compilations of written
state constitutions, the Articles of Confederation, and important treaties provided models on which the framers drew, as did the history of
the classical and early modern European polities.
What then is the best strategy for constitutional framers? At first
blush, the circumstances of constitution-making would seem to entail
that framers should mix imitation and innovation in eclectic proportions, not susceptible to general theorizing or extreme solutions in either direction. Constitutions are typically designed under conditions
of political crisis and urgency. To these dynamic conditions we may
of
add two factors: that the large-scale and long-term consequences
to predict, 4'
difficult
exceedingly
are
rules
the choice of constitutional
and that constitutional framers are properly risk-averse, designing institutions to minimize the risks of political and social disasters rather
than to maximize the gain from political association. These factors
militate in favor of imitation. Militating in favor of innovation, however, is the typical idea that provisions or rules adopted from other jurisdictions will prove maladapted to the local circumstances of the
adopting jurisdiction. At the Convention, John Rutledge criticized the
origination clauses in the state constitutions as "put in through a blind
adherence to the British model. If the work was to be done over now,
they would be omitted."" A complementary claim is that adapted provisions will fail to take root; only constitutions or provisions that are in
some sense organic or indigenous tend to prove stable in the long
term.
The optimum, then, would seem to be the banality that constitutional framers should imitate where appropriate to local circumstances. We may add a modicum of content to this conclusion in two
ways. First, where many jurisdictions have converged on similar constitutional design(s), imitation is more prudent and less costly than innovation. The consensus across jurisdictions suggests that different poli-

43 See Jon Elster, Consequences of Constitutional Choice: Reflections on Tocqueville. in Jon
Elster and Rune Slagstad, eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy 81 (Cambridge 1988).
44 See Seth F Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process
of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U Pa J Const L 640,642 (1999) ("The American Constitution is, in
many dimensions, not an effort designed to achieve the best that government can offer. It is,
rather, an attempt to avoid the worst, an attempt keyed to the peculiar pathologies that have
been shown to be likely to afflict American democracy.").
45
Farrand.ed.2 Federal Convention at 279-80 (cited in note 19).
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ties have converged on a real constitutional optimum, one dictated by
real institutional forces.6 Although the consensus might also rest simply on an opinion cascade or herding effect,47 in which a suboptimal
rule is widely adopted simply because jurisdictions lacking information imitate others whom they (erroneously) take to have better insight, the cascade may, of course, also produce convergence on the optimal rule. Thus, the risks of deviating from a widespread consensus
generally exceed the risks of copying it. Second, framers should distinguish between rules whose principal virtue is settlement of a question
that can be settled equally well one way or the other, on the one hand,
and rules whose content is independently significant, on the other. The
former are better candidates for adoption, since the bare inquiry into
stability or workability answers the only question that needs to be
asked about provisions whose content is of secondary importance.
Even with these supplemental points, it is very hard to say anything in the abstract about the optimal mix of rationalist design versus
adoption. Despite this theoretically pessimistic conclusion, an important dynamic renders the mixed approach unstable, thereby pressing
constitutional framers toward the extremes of global imitation or
global innovation. An illustration of this dynamic appears in the debates over the Origination Clause. Gouvernor Morris argued that "We
should either take the British Constitution altogether or make one for
ourselves.' ' 48As a normative matter, as we have seen, Morris's position
seems questionable. Yet we may reinterpret Morris's point as a positive claim about the choices available to constitutional designers: for
two reasons, the intermediate position that mixes reason with experience, independent evaluation with adoption, may prove unstable. First,
where the designers may draw upon the experience of multiple jurisdictions whose provisions on similar topics conflict with one another,
the appeal to experience is indeterminate; some reason, other than
workability, must be given for adopting one or the other approach.
Second, to propose partial modifications of other jurisdictions' rules
on rationalist grounds is an incoherent stance: if the designer can de46 See generally Saul Levmore, Rethinking Comparative Law: Variety and Uniformity in
Ancient and Modern Tort Law, 61 Tulane L Rev 235,237.285-87 (1986) (arguing that uniformity
exists in tort law across legal systems "when theory tells us a rule matters").
47 For an overview of information cascades and rational herding, see generally Abhijit V.
Banerjee. A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q J Econ 797 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani,
David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J Pol Econ 992.992-94 (1992) (arguing that "localized conformity of
behavior and the fragility of mass behaviors can be explained by information cascades." which
are defined as times "when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those
ahead of him, to follow the behavior of the preceding individual without regard to his own information").
48
Farrand. ed, 1 Federal Convention at 545 (cited in note 30).
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scribe and predict the political mechanisms that make the modification valuable, including the interaction effects of the modification with
the unmodified rules and with other provisions, then the designer necessarily possesses the capacity to conduct an independent evaluation
of the unmodified provisions as well.
An example of the instability of the mixed approach is the very
setting in which Morris's argument on the Origination Clause was
made. The provocation was an important internal tension in Dickinson's position. The English practice was that money bills could originate only in the House of Commons and could not be amended by the
House of Lords. Of the eight states that adopted origination restrictions, however, most allowed the nonoriginating branch to amend
bills." "This he [Dickinson] thought it would be proper for us to do.""'
The first problem here is that of indeterminacy: why should the modified state provisions on origination allowing amendments, rather than
the unmodified package of English practices that barred amendment,
provide the reference for the argument from experience? The second
problem is the incoherence of partial modification: if the effects of
conferring the power of amendment upon the upper branch can be assessed on nonexperiential grounds, why cannot the baseline origination provision be assessed on the same grounds? On this view, the
normatively attractive approach is to mix reason and experience in a
particularistic manner guided by the framers' sense of the situation,
yet the instability of that intermediate stance will tend to push constitutional framers to the extremes of wholesale redesign or wholesale
imitation.
Furthermore, constitutional framing may lean heavily toward either wholesale adoption or redesign for an additional reason: any
change to the baseline requested by a particular drafter would cause
other drafters to suggest and push their preferred changes as well.
Once any single provision is up for grabs, everything is up for grabs. It
is unclear, in the abstract, how these opposing tendencies will net out
in particular constitution-making episodes, but the federal Convention
ultimately moved well toward the extreme of wholesale redesign.
Compared to the existing models in England and the states, the federal Constitution is strikingly original in important respects, most famously in the division of powers between federal and state governments and in the complex rules that parcel lawmaking power between
a bicameral legislature and an independently elected executive.
49 See Farrand, ed,2 Federal Convention at 278 (cited in note 19). See also Joseph Story, 1
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 878 at 610-11 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1858)
(noting that in states that previously did not allow amendment by the senate, such as Virginia
and South Carolina, "it was a constant source of difficulties and contentions").
50 Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 278 (cited in note 19).
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II. THE SUBSTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURE

Part I examined the methodological problems facing the framers
in deciding whether to constitutionalize rules of congressional procedure and in choosing the content of the relevant rules. This Part examines the substance of the rules that the framers adopted, as well as
rules that they might have adopted but did not, where the failure to do
so itself illuminates the constitutional-design questions. Part II.A outlines the scope and limits of the enterprise, while Part II.B introduces
a few major substantive themes of the analysis. Part II.C examines, in
turn, the rules that determine when and by whom the Congress may
be convened or adjourned; issues of membership in the legislature, including the procedures for disqualifying or expelling a (purported)
member; the legislature's choice of officers; the quorum rules that accompany simple majority voting and supermajority voting; the transparency or secrecy of legislative deliberation and voting; the Origination Clause; and joint cameral rulemaking. Finally, I will supplement
the analysis by considering missing provisions-rules of legislative
procedure that might well have been constitutionalized, but were not.
Examples include requirements that each bill address only a single
subject, and that bills be brought up for reading or debate three times
before a final vote can be taken; these and other rules are embodied
in various state and foreign constitutions.
A. Preliminaries
My ambition in this Part is to examine the constitutional law of
congressional procedure from the prescriptive standpoint of constitutional design. I will not ask positive questions about the genesis of the
relevant constitutional rules in the hurly-burly bargaining of the Convention. Nor will I discuss their positive effects, except insofar as anticipation of those effects would be relevant to sound constitutional
design. The prescriptive approach will, however, have useful implications for constitutional interpretation to the extent that the prevailing
theory of interpretation licenses interpreters to fill gaps and ambiguities in the constitutional text with normatively sensible rules.
Constitutional design presupposes some first-order account that
specifies what the aims of design are, and thereby what will count as
an instrumentally successful design. Yet such accounts are the province of political theory, not of consequentialist analysis. Here I will
simply stipulate to a set of widely shared criteria for evaluating congressional performance, criteria stated in rough form and at a relatively low level of abstraction. Congressional procedure should,
among other aims, work to accomplish all of the following.
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1. Minimize principal-agent problems inherent in
legislative representation.
Legislators are agents for their constituents. This need not imply
that legislators should view themselves as mouthpieces for constituent
preferences; should adopt the opposing, Burkean view that legislators
are to exercise independent judgment about the common good; or
should adopt some other view entirely. On any of these conceptions,
legislator-agents are charged with tasks by citizen-principals, and the

ever-present risk is that the agents will divert resources from public
tasks to private gain. Time is a resource, so an important form of diversion is shirking, in which legislators consume leisure rather than attending to public business. An important aim of legislative procedure
is to minimize the social costs of legislators' diversion and shirking, in-

cluding the costs incurred to prevent those problems.'
2. Contribute to well-informed and cognitively undistorted
deliberation about policy.

Legislatures are multi-member policymaking bodies (where policymaking includes the decision to delegate policymaking to others). In
general, the performance of such bodies is a function of the information they possess and the quality of their deliberations. Deliberation

may, in turn, be distorted by a range of decisionmaking pathologies,
including, for example, group polarization, rational and irrational
herding behavior, and conformity and preference falsification. 2 Legislative procedure should encourage representatives to reveal the
private information they hold while dampening deliberative
pathologies."

See, for example, Dennis C. Mueller, Constitutional Democracy 148-49 (Oxford 1996)
(analyzing one-party and two-party alternatives for representative democracy and the danger
that the elitist representatives might "undertake actions different from what the citizens themselves would"). For a discussion of representative politics in agency cost terms, see, for example.
Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, Democratic Devices and Desires 99-104, 156-84 (Cambridge 2000).
52 For information on group polarization, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J Pol Phil 175, 176 (2002) (defining group polarization as the phenomenon that occurs
when "members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the
direction indicated by the members' predeliberation tendencies") (emphasis omitted). For information on herding, see Bikhchandani. Hirshleifer, and Welch, 100 J Pol Econ at 992-94 (cited
in note 47) (arguing that small amounts of information can lead to informational cascades, resulting in conformist behavior). For additional information on conformity and preference falsification, see generally Cass R. Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent 14-38 (Harvard 2003) (noting
that "people are extremely vulnerable to the unanimous views of others" and that group identity
exacerbates this effect).
53 See, for example, Sunstein. Why Societies Need Dissent at 111-65 (cited in note 52)
(evaluating legislative structure, particularly bicameralism, in these terms).
51
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3. Make technically efficient use of legislative resources.
Congress, like other legislatures, operates under severe resource
constraints. Perhaps the most important of these resources is time. The
legislative agenda is extremely compressed, and no single legislator
can spend enough time on policy analysis to comprehend more than a
small fraction of the issues the legislature takes up. Modern legislatures have accordingly evolved committee systems, in part to promote
a division of labor and specialization in the production of information
and policies. In a similar vein, legislative procedure should, among its
other aims, help to ensure that Congress uses scarce resources in the
most efficient possible manner. Holding constant the quality and
quantity of congressional output, attaining that output at unnecessarily high social cost is a pure loss.
Stipulating to a set of widely shared aims in this fashion is a
common procedure in the institutional-design literature, and for good
reason. First, the evaluative criteria I have posited are widely shared,
in part, because they are the common denominator of the rival camps
of political theory. Theoretical approaches may, from diverse starting
points, converge to an "overlapping consensus"" or "incompletely
theorized agreement"" on mid-level institutional ideas-for example
the idea that legislative representatives should be deterred from shirking or from diverting public resources for private gain. Second-this
point is merely the converse of the first-disagreements at the level of
high theory often fail to cut between concrete institutional-design
choices." To prefigure a later example, the decision whether to require
a minimum quorum for legislative business does not turn critically on
rival conceptions of democracy or good legislation. Third, institutional
arrangements of one sort or another must be devised and evaluated
even if political theory has not (yet) achieved consensus on the aims
of constitutionalism, and perhaps will never do so. "[I]f we put off the
questions of institutional design until the higher-order questions are
settled, we will get to them at the time of Godot's arrival. In the meantime, however, life goes on and we need grounds for preferring some
institutional arrangements over others." 7 Finally, and most pragmati54
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 340 (Belknap rev ed 1999) (noting that "however much
[ conceptions of justice differ, [sometimes disparate] views support the same judgment in the
situation at hand").
55 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 35-61 (Oxford 1996) (arguing
that, when people adhere to a general principle, they "need not agree what it entails in particular
cases," and discussing how this often occurs in the drafting of constitutions and other laws).
56 For an argument applying this point to the nondelegation doctrine, see Dan M. Kahan,
Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 Cardozo L Rev 795,797-800 (1999) (claiming that "the concept of
democracy, by itself, doesn't uniquely determine the structure of government institutions").
57 Ian Shapiro, Democracy's Place 223 (Cornell 1996).
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cally, discussing institutional design with only a rough picture of the
underlying aims is a sensible division of academic labor. Theory specialists may usefully focus on principles, but that is not my project
here.
As we will see, the difficult enterprise is not stating the aims to
which well-designed legislative procedure should conduce, but rather
negotiating the inevitable tradeoffs between and among them. Because those aims cannot simultaneously be maximized, the devil is in
the details, and good constitutional design requires detailed institutional analysis.
B.

Substantive Themes

Before shifting to details, a brief preview of the major substantive
themes may help frame the analysis. Across a range of constitutional
provisions and design problems, the constitutional law of congressional procedure displays important thematic regularities.
1. Congressional and cameral autonomy.
A major theme involves the question whether and in what respects Congress enjoys procedural autonomy-the legal authority to
structure its procedures without the imprimatur of other officials or
institutions. In general, the relevant constitutional rules might allow
Congress to structure its internal procedures with greater or lesser independence from (1) constitutional framers, (2) the president, or
(3) the electorate. Independence from constitutional framers turns on
which rules of congressional procedure the framers desire to constitutionalize, and why. The question of procedural independence from the
executive-whether and when the executive would possess the power
to structure or participate in the internal proceedings of Congresswas among the most consequential decisions the framers faced, and
remains a major constitutional-design quandary in new democratic
regimes that opt for an independently elected executive." Examples
under the federal Constitution include the president's powers to convene and adjourn Congress and the constitutional mandate that the
vice president, an executive officer, preside over the Senate (except in
impeachment cases)." The third kind of congressional autonomy, Congress's procedural independence from the electorate, is implicated
when the electorate's choice of representatives is given constitutional
significance in ways that override congressional choices. An example
58 See John M. Carey, Frantisek Formanek, and Ewa Karpowicz, Legislative Autonomy in
New Regimes: The Czech and Polish Cases, in Loewenberg, Squire, and Kiewiet, eds, Legislatures
352,353-55 (cited in note 7).
59 US Const Art I,§ 3,cl 4.
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of this last point involves provisions present in several state constitutions, but conspicuously absent from the federal Constitution, allowing
legislatures to expel a member (usually by supermajority), but not
twice for the same cause. The final proviso, seemingly a type of double-jeopardy guarantee, is better understood in structural terms: it allows the electorate to override a congressional expulsion decision by
reelecting a given representative.
A related question involves not the independence of Congress, as
a body, from other institutions, but the question of cameral autonomy-the authority of each house of Congress to make procedural
decisions and to set procedural rules independent of the other house.
Globally speaking, the Rules of Proceedings Clause enables "[e]ach
House [to] determine the Rules of its proceedings," which suggests a
high degree of (permitted or mandatory) cameral autonomy. In
Part II.C.8 I shall examine whether the two houses acting jointly may
enact a statute that binds the houses, when acting separately, to follow
internal procedures specified in the statute itself. As we will see, similar issues arise in many other procedural settings.
2. The role of political parties.
Our constitutional framers were essentially ignorant about political parties in the modern sense. Although the framers thought deeply
about the vices of "faction, '' "2 the modern political party so greatly increases the formality and operative power of the eighteenth-century
faction as to amount to a different kind of institution. So one of our
principal tasks will be to reconsider the constitutional design of congressional procedure in light of the "party-in-government,"" meaning
(for our purposes) the institutionalization of factions within the modern Congress. Methodologically, this development increases the informational value of constitutions designed after (and with knowledge
of) the spread of political parties, such as state and foreign constitu6O See, for example, Conn Const Art III, § 13 ("Each house shall ... punish members for
disorderly conduct, and. with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time
for the same cause."); Ill Const Art IV. § 6(d) ("A member may be expelled only once for the
same offense."): Ind Const Art IV. § 14 ("Either House may punish its members for disorderly
behavior, and may, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member; but not a second time for
the same cause."); Ky Const § 39 ("Each House of the General Assembly may ... with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for the same cause.");Tenn Const
Art II. § 12 ("Each house may ... with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member, but not a
second time for the same offence.").
61
USConst Art l.§5.cl2.
62
See, for example. Federalist 10 (Madison). in The Federalist 56.60 (cited in note 25).
63 See V.0. Key, Jr.. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups 495 (Crowell 1942). For application of the party-in-government idea to Congress, see Garrett. 100 Colum L Rev at 702 (cited in
note 24) (discussing, for example, whether the congressional budget procedures adopted in 1974
redistributed political power within Congress from committee chairs to political parties).
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tions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Substantively, we need
to consider how parties affect the eighteenth-century blueprint for
congressional procedure. In Part II.C.4, to pick one example, we will
see that optimal quorum rules may be quite different for a legislature
composed of unaffiliated individuals than for a legislature dominated
by two major parties.
We will also see that the relationship between political parties
and congressional autonomy is ambiguous, and will cash out differently in different settings. The rise of parties can increase or decrease
the relative power of the executive and of legislators over congressional procedure. In Part II.C.3 we will examine these issues in the setting of the vice presidency and its evolution (or devolution). On the
other hand, to the extent that parties form cross-cutting links between
their members in Congress, the executive, and other institutions, then
institutional power per se becomes less important. Partisan competition will take place across institutions, and parties will use institutions
simply as arenas in which to stage conflict.
3. The evolution of quasi-constitutional norms.
Another large theme involves the endogenous development,
within Congress, of institutional norms that parallel, supplement, or
undermine explicit constitutional rules. In Part II.C.6 we will examine
both the Origination Clause, which grants the House exclusive authority to originate revenue-raising measures, and also a parallel, endogenous norm that grants the House origination authority over appropriations measures as well. In Part II.C.5 we will examine norms of
transparency for committee voting that, although not constitutionally
mandated, supplement various constitutional mandates (or triggers)
that require roll call voting for the final passage of legislation.
Legislative norms raise important questions both for constitutional designers, who might anticipate their development, and for later
constitutional reformers, who must reckon with their existence. Where
a desirable norm exists, or might be predicted to develop, should it be
explicitly constitutionalized? One intuition is no, because constitutionalization is unnecessary, and might disrupt the norm itself. Perhaps
subtly nuanced norms are not easily captured in relatively crude constitutional language. The contrary intuition is yes: precisely because
valuable norms are fragile and vulnerable to exogenous shocks, constitutional designers are imprudent to hope for their development or to
rely on their persistence. Constitutionalization entrenches norms
against future change. Where the norm already exists, that very fact
provides evidence that a constitutional equivalent will not disrupt the
legislature's functions.
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4. Decision and error costs.
Last, and perhaps most obviously, constitutional rules of legislative procedure should be designed to minimize (the sum of) the costs
of reaching decisions and the costs of errors or mistakes. Here mistakes are defined by reference to whatever normative criteria are entailed by the designer's high-level account of good legislative performance, or-as discussed above-by reference to the common denominator or overlapping consensus among competing accounts of
good legislative performance. The ambition to minimize decision and
error costs follows from the idea that legislatures should make efficient use of scarce resources. Reaching good decisions in unnecessarily costly ways and reaching erroneous decisions both produce deadweight losses. These ideas are pervasively useful, and are applied
throughout.
C.

Design Questions

With the scope of the project delineated and the major themes introduced, we will proceed seriatim through the major constitutional
rules of congressional procedure, including rules that are (surprisingly) absent from the federal Constitution.
1. Convening and adjourning the Congress.
The Constitution structures the timing and location of congressional sessions in several ways. In addition to the mandate of Article I
and of the Twentieth Amendment that "[t]he Congress shall assemble
at least once in every Year,""' Article I also provides that "[n]either
House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place
than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting. ' . Article II gives
certain scheduling powers to the president, who may "on extraordinary occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of
Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper."' A
residual provision exempts agreements between the houses on questions of adjournment from presentment to the president."7 In part
these provisions address concerns arising from the high costs of travel
and information in the founding era, and the fierce sectional loyalties
Const Art I, § 4, cl2: US Const Amend XX, § 2.
Const Art I, § 5, cl4.
66
Const Art II,§ 3.
67
Const Art I, § 7, cl3 ("Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President.").
64
65

US
US
US
US
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that hampered attempts to fix the seat of government. Those concerns
are largely obsolete today. These provisions retain great significance,
however, for they implicate and illustrate the central thematic issues
of congressional independence and cameral independence.
As for the issue of congressional independence, the principal
Convention debates centered upon the twin questions of whether
rules about the timing and location of congressional sessions should
be constitutionalized, and the extent to which the executive should be
authorized to participate in the relevant decisions. The background of
these debates was a set of chronic complaints about executive influence over legislative procedure generally, and over the timing and location of legislative sessions in particular. The English monarchs possessed traditional prerogatives to convene and to prorogue, or dissolve, both Parliament and colonial legislatures. The Declaration of
Independence, however, complained of George III that:
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance
with his measures. -He has dissolved Representative Houses
repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his invasions on the
rights of the people. -He has refused for a long time, after such
dissolutions, to cause others to be elected.'
As the second clause hints, a widespread view in the founding era
depicted frequent legislative sessions as an important safeguard
against executive encroachments on political liberty, and Article I's
provision mandating annual meetings of Congress was justified principally on the grounds that frequent assemblies were necessary "as a
check on the Executive department.""' One theme in the debate involved the costs of travel; although some state constitutions required
even more frequent sessions, Joseph Story argued that the geographic
scale of the new republic made such a system excessively costly for
federal representatives, given "the distance of their abodes."7 ' An even
more important feature of the constitutional rules was the great extent to which they minimized executive authority over the timing of
congressional sessions, as compared to the English baseline. The basic
asymmetry in the relevant rules is that they push Congress toward
remaining in session. Congress is required to convene annually, as a

68
69

United States Declaration of Independence (1776).
Kurland and Lerner, eds, 2 Founders' Constitution at 283 (cited in note 17). See also

note 18.
70
Story, 1 Commentaries §§ 827-28 at 574 (cited in note 49) (glossing the Clause as a
pragmatic measure, and contrasting it with the British constitution, which grants the monarch the
right to convene and dissolve Parliament).
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check upon the freedom of executive action; the president may convene the Congress (on extraordinary occasions), but has no power to
dissolve it against the joint wish of both houses. The only circumstance
in which the president may dissolve is when the two houses disagree
on the timing of adjournment; and the framers seem to have enacted
this proviso only from inability to imagine that any other institution
might be a plausible candidate to break deadlocks between the houses

(with respect to adjournment)."
Taken as a package, these rules minimize the risk that the executive will aggrandize itself at Congress's expense by means of strategic
dissolution. Participants in the relevant debates, however, were largely
insensitive to the principal cost of maximizing congressional autonomy in this way. A major constitutional-design consideration, arising
in contexts ranging from congressional procedure to official compensation to judicial review, is that minimizing interbranch encroachment
or aggrandizement by guaranteeing autonomy to threatened institutions constantly trades off against an increased risk of self-dealing by
those (autonomous) institutions.72 The constitutional rules that enable
aggressor institutions to encroach upon competitors are the same
rules that keep the competitors' strategic self-dealing in check; the risk
of aggrandizement is a typical byproduct of a design choice to mini-

mize self-interested official action through institutional competition.
In the extreme scenario-a scenario that materialized at several
points in English history-we can imagine that a legislature granted
constitutional autonomy over the timing of its own dissolution might,
for self-interested reasons, choose never to dissolve at all. As William
Rawle observed,

71 As it turns out, the houses of Congress have never failed to agree on an adjournment
date, and no president has ever exercised the power to break disagreements over adjournment.
See Charles Tiefer, CongressionalPracticeand Procedure:A Reference, Research, and Legislative
Guide 29-30 n 35 (Greenwood 1989).
72
For some earlier efforts to apply this point in various settings, see generally Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Official Compensation, 102 Colum L Rev 501 (2002); Adrian
Vermeule,JudicialReview and InstitutionalChoice,43 Wm & Mary L Rev 1557 (2002).
Daryl Levinson has emphasized, in conversation, an important methodological point. Institutions have no desires, for power or anything else. Ideas about the risk that legislative or executive
institutions will seek to "aggrandize" power must in principle be capable of reduction to some
microfoundational account of the behavior of individual legislators or executive officials.
In my view, however, such a reduction is unproblematic in many cases. A range of mechanisms may cause officials to wish to increase the power, broadly defined, of the institutions they
occupy. For a brief catalogue of possible mechanisms, see Jon Elster, The Role of InstitutionalInterest in East European Constitution-Making, 5 E Eur Const Rev 63 (Winter 1996) (arguing that
legislators might be motivated to favor a strong legislature out of personal interest, emotional
identification with the institution, socialization, or other mechanisms). In what follows I shall
elide the relevant explanations. using ideas like "aggrandizement" as a convenient shorthand for
the relevant microfoundational accounts of official behavior.
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without a constitutional limit on its duration, it must be conceded, that a power in the legislature to protract its own continuance, would be dangerous. Blackstone attributes the misfortunes
of Charles I. to his having unadvisedly passed an act to continue
the parliament, then in being, till such time as it should please to
dissolve itself, and this is one of the many proofs that the much
praised constitution of that country wants the character of
certainty."
To be sure, as Rawle also observed, the constitutional provision
for limited congressional terms sets an outer bound on the size of this
danger: "No act of Congress could prolong the continuance of the legislature beyond the term fixed by the Constitution."" Yet within that
capacious limit Congress may manipulate adjournment with a view to
maximizing its members' chances of retaining office or to imposing
political costs on the president. In modern times, examples of strategic
uses of the adjournment power are thick on the ground."
Nor is it difficult to imagine institutional-design alternatives that
might attain the same degree of legislative independence from the executive while creating a reduced risk of strategic legislative behavior,
thus producing a design improvement on any view of the necessary
tradeoffs. Even if autonomy and self-dealing trade off against each
other beyond some specified point, institutional-design proposals
might produce gains along both margins if that point has not yet been
reached. One possibility would be to randomly select the date of adjournment at the beginning of the legislative session; under this rule
the adjournment date would be chosen for no reason at all, but at
least it would not be chosen for self-interested reasons held by either
legislators or the executive. Under this regime, legislators anticipating
the adjournment date might still engage in strategic behavior, using
the confusion of a session's close to push through projects that would
have failed earlier in that session. Here the intuition is that the sheer
volume of business that always marks the end of legislative sessions
increases the costs to other legislators and interest groups of detecting
and blocking such legislation. But the same behavior is possible in the
73
William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 34-35 (Nicklin
2d ed 1829).
74
Id.
75 See, for example, Andrew Taylor, Lawmakers Accept Adjournment Delays despite
Toughest Issues Being Left for Last: A Strange Calm on Capitol Hill as GOP Opts for Unrushed
Exit, CQ Weekly 2401-03 (Oct 14. 2000) (observing that the 2000 Congress was "'limping to a
close" as legislators continued to negotiate on spending bills while its work was overshadowed
by the presidential campaign between then-Vice President Al Gore and then-Texas Governor
George W. Bush), Richard E. Cohen. Good Vibrations, 29 Nat] J 1732, 1732-33 (Sept 6,1997)
(reporting that Congress intended to adjourn early so members could tout legislative successes
at home).
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current regime so long as the adjournment date is announced in advance; and we shall examine state constitutional provisions that check
this sort of strategic action by providing that no bills may be enacted
or, alternatively, introduced within a specified time of adjournment."
The time between the constitutionally specified date and the date of
adjournment is time in which public opprobrium may be brought to
bear on legislators for their actions late in the session.
Alternatively, the randomly chosen date of adjournment need not
be established and announced in advance. Another possibility is sequential randomization, in which the legislative session is subject to a
specified chance of ending abruptly on any particular day. The resultant uncertainty would force legislators to set the volume and timing
of legislative business behind a partial veil of ignorance." Both this
possibility and the preceding one, however, have an impractical air
about them, if only because constitutional rules rarely employ ranbenefits.
domization, even where randomization would have obvious
Cameral autonomy-the reciprocal independence of each house
from the other, rather than the independence of Congress from the
executive-was also an important consideration in the debates over
the timing and location of congressional sessions. Here the principal
debates centered on the Article I provision that barred either house
from adjourning without the other's consent. In the view of proponents, such as Madison, this provision minimized the chance that Congress would fail to be in session when "public exigencies" warranted
legislative action."9 This rationale assumes that the false negative, the
failure to be in session when the public interest so requires, is more
damaging than the false positive, the occurrence of a legislative session when there is no real public business to conduct. By contrast,
many state constitutions seek to minimize the false positive by providing, for example, that the legislature may convene only every other
year. In the view of Madison's opponents, the vice of the Article I provision requiring the houses to agree on adjournment was to create an
unacceptable risk that the Senate would dominate the House of RepSee notes 237-39 and accompanying text.
The foregoing addresses the timing of congressional sessions. Similar arguments about
the independence of congressional procedure from executive control also arose with respect to
the location of congressional sessions. See Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 261-62 (cited in
note 19). As these are of little importance today, I do not discuss them here.
78 See Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 424-26 (cited in note 23) (noting the infrequent use of
randomization and suggesting that the framers' crabbed understanding of "reason" as
"suppl[ying] the measure of good constitutional design" explains their failure to employ randomization devices).
79 Farrand, ed, 3 Federal Convention at 312 (cited in note 30) (recording Madison's response to Monroe's concern that the adjournment provision would grant undue power to the
Senate by allowing it to keep the House from adjourning).
76

77
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resentatives. As George Mason put it in the Virginia ratifying convention:
The house of representatives is the only check on the senate, with
their enormous powers. But by that clause you give them the
power of worrying the house of representatives into a compliance with any measure. The senators living at the spot will feel no
inconvenience from long sessions, as they will vote themselves
handsome pay, without incurring any additional expences. Your
representatives are on a different ground, from their shorter continuance in office. The gentlemen from Georgia are six or seven
hundred miles from home, and wish to go home. The senate taking advantage of this, by stopping the other house from adjourning, may worry them into any thing."
The argument of this confused passage seems to assume that federal legislative careers would always remain a part-time or even amateur pursuit. The greater the fraction of representatives' income that is
obtained from local business or professional pursuits outside the legislative session, the more the joint-consent rule for adjournment increases the relative leverage of senators. Today, however, the sharply
reduced costs of travel and the professionalization of federal legislative careers have made Mason's particular concern anachronistic.
2. Membership: disqualification and expulsion.
Article I provides that "[elach House may ...punish its Members
for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member." This short clause raises no less than three interpretive puzzles that we must clear away before addressing questions of
optimal constitutional design. The first puzzle is whether the twothirds supermajority vote requires two-thirds of the whole expelling
house, or merely two-thirds of a quorum; this is a question about supermajority quorum requirements, examined below. A second and
more fundamental puzzle involves the relationship between the Expulsion Clause and the power of each house to "be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members."" On one
view, the distinction between these powers is temporal: disqualification by a simple majority can occur only before a member is seated,
while after a member is seated the only recourse is expulsion by supermajority. A different view, which I will adopt, is David Currie's argument that the distinction between the powers turns solely on the
80 Kurland and Lerner, eds, 2 Founders' Constitution at 293-94 (cited in note 17).
81 US Const Art 1,§ 5, cl2.
82 US Const Art I, § 5, cl 1.
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ground on which each may be exercised. "A simple majority may determine at any time that a member is not qualified; expulsion of a duly
elected member for any other reason requires stronger support."" The
final puzzle is whether the "disorderly Behaviour" that the Expulsion
Clause authorizes each house to punish refers only to behavior that
disrupts legislative business, or whether expulsion instead lies for a
broader category of conduct, including conduct occurring outside the
legislature itself or during a legislative recess. Here both congressional
and judicial precedent have taken an expansive view of the expulsion
power: following Story's analysis of early expulsion cases in the Senate, "' the Supreme Court has said that "[t]he right to expel extends to
all cases where the offence is such as in the judgment of the Senate is
inconsistent with the trust and duty of a member.""
The framers' decision to lodge the powers of disqualification and
expulsion in each house separately, without the participation of any
outside institution, embodies two decisions, one in favor of cameral
autonomy and one in favor of congressional autonomy. As to the first,
it is hardly unimaginable that the power to disqualify or expel a member of either house (briefly, the power to make "membership decisions") could have been lodged in the houses acting jointly. The obvious analogy is to the powers surrounding impeachment, which are
partitioned between the two houses in complex ways: the House of
Representatives possesses the "sole Power of Impeachment," while
the Senate possesses the "sole Power to try all Impeachments" and
may convict by a supermajority of two-thirds of "the Members present." Impeachment lies only against "civil Officers of the United
States," 7 but it is hardly obvious that federal legislators do not count
as such officers. Early Congresses struggled mightily with the issue before apparently concluding that legislators are "officers" for purposes
of the presidential succession provisions of Article II, but not for purposes of the impeachment provisions.^
83
David P Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Jeffersonians, 1801-1829 75 (Chicago
2001). The "qualifications" of which each house may judge are, the Court has held, limited to the
minimum constitutional qualifications set out in Art I, § 2, cl2 (representatives) and Art I. § 3,
cl3 (senators). See Powell v McCormack. 395 US 486,550 (1969).
84 Story, 1 Commentaries § 838 at 579 (cited in note 49) (discussing the expulsion cases of
William Blount, who was expelled for attempting to suborn an American agent among the Indians, and John Smith. who was nearly expelled for an alleged treasonable conspiracy).
85 In re Chapman, 166 US 661,669-70 (1897).
86 US Const Art I,§ 2,cl 5;US Const Art I, § 3,ci 6.
87
US Const Art I1,§ 4 ("The President. Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States. shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of.Treason, Bribery. or
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.").
88 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789-1801 139-44.
279-81 (Chicago 1997) (suggesting that the term "Officers of the United States" as used in the
impeachment provisions was meant to exclude congressional officers, while the simple term "of-
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Analogously, we might imagine a constitutional division of labor
in which one house brings a proceeding for disqualification or expulsion of its own members, with the merits of the charge judged by the
other house. The framers' choice in favor of cameral autonomy might,
on this view, be condemned in the vocabulary of the common law on
the ground that it makes each house the sole judge of its own cause in
membership cases. The instinct here, a pervasive one in both the constitutional structure and in eighteenth-century legal theory, is to separate the power to prosecute from the power to adjudicate.9 The point
must be qualified in light of the Supreme Court's quite recent assertion of power to review cameral disqualification decisions, discussed
below, but of course that decision has not yet been extended to expulsion decisions; and in any event, the question here is simply cameral
autonomy, not the involvement of noncongressional institutions.
The argument for cameral autonomy in membership decisions is
that the houses are institutional competitors, so that crossparticipation in membership decisions creates a risk of intercameral
aggrandizement, with the reviewing house basing its decisions on partisan or institutional advantage rather than the constitutional merits.
But here, as elsewhere, the basic cost of cameral autonomy is an enhanced risk of self-dealing by legislative factions, in the absence of any
mechanism for external review. To be sure, the symmetry of the crossparticipation alternative, in which each house reviews the other's decisions, might produce a possible ameliorating mechanism: each house
might refrain from patently self-interested review for fear of retaliation by the other. Yet if membership cases are rare (and they are), and
if retaliation on other margins (say, by refusing to enact bills sought by
the offending house) is a highly imperfect substitute, then the fear of
retaliation will prove at best a weak deterrent, subject to domination
by the political gains that might flow to the aggrandizing house from
self-interested review in particular cases.
The framers' second design choice-to lodge the powers of disqualification and expulsion in (the houses of) Congress alone, without
the participation of other institutions-implicates similar considerations. If it seems unimaginable to lodge review or approval of expulsion decisions in an outside institution, consider the many analogies
elsewhere in the constitutional structure. Many of the stock foundingera arguments for subjecting legislative lawmaking to presidential reficer" was specifically used in the presidential succession provisions to include legislators).
89 See US Const Art I, § 9, cl3 (depriving Congress of prosecutorial power by providing
that "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed"). See also Forrest McDonald,
Novus Ordo Sectorun: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution 80-87 (Kansas 1985) (describing how Americans embraced apportioning powers among the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:361

view, by means of the veto power, transpose comfortably to membership decisions; it is hard to see any a priori reason for thinking that
those decisions are any less or more susceptible to the sort of factionalized decisionmaking and legislative herd behavior that caused the
framers to provide for the presidential veto. It is irrelevant that the
Article I lawmaking process contains a built-in status quo default (a
successful veto prevents a change in the law), while membership decisions, especially qualification decisions, sometimes require a compulsory choice between alternative candidates, with no legal default position. Even in the latter case the president or other outside body might
be given the power to review the grounds on which the choice is made,
with a remand to the initiating house if those grounds are found to be
illegitimate. Beyond the possibility of review by the president, we
must also consider the possibility of review of membership decisions
by the Supreme Court. The Court has already undertaken a limited
version of such review in disqualification cases, albeit only as to the
legal question of whether the asserted ground of disqualification is
among those set out in Article I."
To set against the possibility of outside review by other federal
institutions is the standard legislative-autonomy argument: authority
over membership decisions should be vested solely in the legislature
to minimize the risk of aggrandizement by competing institutions.
Consider Story's argument for legislative autonomy in membership
decisions:
It is obvious, that a power must be lodged somewhere to judge of
the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of each
house composing the legislature; for otherwise there could be no
certainty, as to who were legitimately chosen members.... The
only possible question on such a subject is, as to the body, in
which such a power shall be lodged. If lodged in any other, than
the legislative body itself, its independence, its purity, and even its
existence and action may be destroyed, or put into imminent
danger. No other body, but itself, can have the same motives to
preserve and perpetuate these attributes."'
The fallacy here is by now obvious. Story's argument, which implicitly compares a well-motivated legislature with an ill-motivated
reviewing body, amounts to an incomplete cost-benefit analysis. It ignores the potential costs of legislative autonomy, if ill-motivated legislative factions use membership decisions for partisan ends, and the potential benefits of external review, if well-motivated executive or judi9
See Powell, 395 US at 550 (holding that, in judging the qualifications of its members,
Congress is limited to the standing qualifications enumerated in the Constitution).
91 Story, 1 Commentaries § 833 at 575-76 (cited in note 49).
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cial officials provide an impartial assessment of qualifications, the disruptive effects of legislators' behavior, and other relevant questions.
Given this structural tradeoff between legislative autonomy and
legislative self-dealing, we may interpret the supermajority requirement for expulsion as an attempt to minimize the costs of the latter
while maximizing the benefits of the former. Madison's idea, anticipating modern work on the economics of voting rules," was to minimize
factional abuse not by mandating outside review, but by raising the
costs of assembling the necessary faction. Supermajority rules are
close substitutes for bicameralism, " so requiring the former in effect
compromises cameral autonomy over expulsion decisions without involving outsiders.
There are, however, two serious objections to Madison's design
choice. First, as we have seen, the supermajority requirement creates
costs on another margin, the one identified by Gouvernor Morris:4 the
supermajority requirement minimizes false positive, (unjustified decisions to expel), but increases false negatives (unjustified decisions not
to expel)."5 Second, and less obviously, the supermajority rule for expulsions does nothing to minimize abuse of the disqualification power,
and that gap encourages legislative substitution from ill-motivated expulsion to ill-motivated disqualification; the attempted disqualification
of Adam Clayton Powell may have been an example. To the extent
that substitution from partisan expulsion to partisan disqualification
occurs, it supports the Supreme Court's decision to limit the grounds
for disqualification to the narrow lists set out in Article I." This functionalist defense of the Court's disqualification jurisprudence improves upon the exhausting and inconclusive originalist debates about
the exclusivity of the Qualification Clauses that fractured the Court
7 and in U.S. Term Limits, Inc v Thornboth in Powell v McCormack9
ton.

92
See generally James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy 211 (Michigan 1962) (noting that requiring more
than a simple majority for a decision increases decisionmaking costs).
93 See id at 235-36.
94 See note 28 and accompanying text.
95 We might support Madison's view with the additional claim that error costs here are
asymmetric, because erroneous expulsions are more costly than erroneous failures to expel. The
probability that a single bad legislator will cast a decisive bad vote is small, while the loss of legitimacy from an erroneous expulsion is large. But this reasoning might be incomplete: perhaps
the legislator who would have been justifiably expelled, under simple majority voting, will have a
more disruptive influence on deliberation and the conduct of legislative business than his fractional voting share would suggest.
96
See Powell, 395 US at 550.
97
395 US 486 (1969).
98 514 US 779 (1995).
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A promising alternative to the supermajority requirement is embodied in state constitutional provisions that bar legislatures from
twice expelling a member for the same conduct. The effect of the
state provisions is to create a mechanism for outside review by lodging
in the electorate a power to override the legislature's expulsion decision, so these provisions compromise legislative autonomy vis-a-vis
the electorate. On the most extreme version of legislative autonomy,
one actually articulated by legislators during early expulsion proceedings, "the voters should not be able to elect anyone repugnant to two
thirds of the House."" The response to this view is not an abstract argument from democratic theory, that the legislature ought to be bound
to respect the voters' choice of representative; that argument would
condemn any legislative power to expel a duly elected member in any
circumstances. The right argument for this sort of provision is simply
that this form of outside review is, as a matter of institutional design,
superior to any of the alternatives, either the supermajority requirement or the hypothetical alternatives that would vest review of expulsion decisions in the other house or in the president. Unlike the supermajority requirement, the electoral-review mechanism carries no
built-in skew in favor of false negatives; unlike outside review by
other federal institutions, it does not place the reviewing function in
the hands of a presumptively hostile institutional competitor.
The states' rule barring a second expulsion for the same conduct
might plausibly be interpolated into the existing constitutional text. I
have already sketched the consequentialist case for that reading, but it
might be justified on originalist grounds as well.'" In the founding era,
famous precedents arising out of the British Parliament's expulsion of
John Wilkes were widely cited as establishing the bar on reexpulsion,"'2 and early legislators suggested that a similar rule might it99 For representative state constitutional provisions, see note 60. In the House of Representatives, "policy considerations, as opposed to questions of power, have generally restrained
the House in exercising the authority to expel a Member when ... the conduct complained of occurred in a prior Congress when the electorate knew of the conduct but still re-elected the
Member to the current Congress." Jack Maskell, Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House of Representatives 6-7, CRS Report RL31382 (Apr 16,2002).
100 Currie, Federalist Period at 265 (cited in note 88) (discussing the attempts to expel Matthew Lyon of Vermont for spitting in the face of a colleague who had accused him of cowardice
and later on the basis of his conviction for sedition).
101 For example, James Wilson argued in 1791 that the election of a previously expelled legislator "is a proof, that, in the opinion of his constituents, he either has not offended at all, or has
been already sufficiently punished for his offence." Kurland and Lerner. eds, 2 Founders' Constitution at 300 (cited in note 17).
102 Id at 285. referring to Junius, No 18, Cannon 97 (July 29. 1769) ("If the expulsion of a
member, not under any legal disability, of itself creates in him an incapacity to be elected, I see a
ready way marked out, by which the majority may at any time remove the honestest and ablest
men who happen to be in opposition to them.").
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self be implicit in Article I's expulsion provision."" Under the current
constitutional rules, however, an interpolated requirement barring reexpulsion would be cumulative with, rather than a substitute for, the
supermajority requirement, so this is ultimately an argument for constitutional reform rather than simply a novel interpretation. Yet several state constitutions contain the same combination of supermajority rules with a ban on second expulsions." Given the usual fog of empirical uncertainty that hovers around questions of optimal constitutional design, interpreters of the federal Constitution might do well to
mimic those jurisdictions, thereby assuming, until it is proven otherwise, that an interpolated ban on re-expulsion would produce a net
improvement.
3.

Legislative officers.

The Constitution grants the House of Representatives full authority to "chuse their Speaker and other Officers.""' Not so for the
Senate; Article I specifies that "[t]he Vice President of the United
States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless
they be equally divided."' 6 Although the senators are authorized to
"chuse their other Officers," they must also choose "a President pro
tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States."''"
Implicit in these provisions are a number of important design
choices. Generally speaking, legislative officers may be chosen by the
legislature itself or by some other body, such as constitutional framers
or the executive; legislative officers may be members of the legislature
in their own right, or else outsiders; and legislative officers may hold
full voting rights, including the power to cast tiebreaking votes, may
hold limited voting rights, such as the power to cast only tiebreaking
votes, or may hold no voting rights at all. We will examine the framers'

013 Currie. Federalist Period at 264 n 219 (cited in note 88) (reporting Representative Samuel Sitgreaves's suggestion in the debates over the proposed expulsion of Matthew Lyon that "if
Lyon's constituents approved of his conduct they were free to elect him again").
104 See, for example, Conn Const Art 1II, § 13 ("Each house shall ...with the consent of
two-thirds, expel a member, but not a second time for the same cause."): Ill Const Art IV,§ 6(d)
("A member may be expelled only once for the same offense."): Ind Const Art IV. § 14 ("Either
House may punish its members for disorderly behavior, and may. with the concurrence of twothirds, expel a member; but not a second time for the same cause."); Ky Const § 39 ("Each House
of the General Assembly may ... expel a member, but not a second time for the same cause."):
W Va Const Art VI, § 25 ("Each house may ... with the concurrence of two thirds of the members elected thereto, expel a member, but not twice for the same offence.").
105 US Const Art I, § 2,cl5.
16 US Const Art 1.§ 3,cl 4.
§ 3.cl 5.
107 US Const Art I,
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choices along these dimensions and compare them with Bentham's
views about the optimal structure of legislative officeholding.
The Convention's most important decision was the threshold
choice to constitutionalize the Senate's presiding officer. Why should
not the Senate, like the House, have been given discretion to choose
all of its officers? In Part I, we examined good normative reasons to
constitutionalize rules of congressional procedure. As a historical matter, such reasons do not seem to have motivated the Convention's decision, at least not in the main. Rather the major impetus behind the
decision was simply the desire to give the vice president some official
function, other than standing by in hopes of succeeding the president.
Roger Sherman argued that "[i]f the vice-President were not to be
President of the Senate, he would be without employment.' " Oliver
Williamson likewise observed that "such an officer as vice-President
was not wanted. He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable
mode of election which required two to be chosen at the same time.' ""
The reference here is to the electoral scheme for president and vice
president adopted in Article II, section 1, clause 3, and later modified
by the Twelfth Amendment.
This is not to say, however, that no normatively attractive reasons
for constitutionalizing the choice of the Senate's presiding officer existed; some were even discussed at the Convention. Sherman buttressed his argument for vice presidential employment with the idea
that, if the presiding officer were chosen from among the senators,
"some member by being made President must be deprived of his vote,
unless when an equal division of votes might happen in the Senate,
which would be but seldom.."" The premise of this argument was
wrong; the member chosen to preside might retain his vote in the ordinary course and receive a tiebreaking vote. This alternative, however, would in effect give the presiding member two votes. Story's improved version articulated the dilemma:
If the speaker were not allowed to vote, except where there was
an equal division, independent of his own vote, then the state
might lose its own voice; if he were allowed to give his vote, and
also a casting vote, then the state might, in effect, possess a double vote."'
Unfortunately, both Sherman's original argument and Story's improvement rest on a non sequitur. At most the voting argument shows
that the Senate should be constitutionally required to choose a presid10 Farrand, ed.2 Federal Convention at 537 (cited in note 19).
1()9 Id.
I O Farrand,ed,2 Federal Convention at 537 (cited in note 19).
I" Story. 1 Commentaries § 738 at 514-15 (cited in note 49).
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ing officer from outside the membership. It does not show that the
Constitutional Convention itself should have decided who that outsider would be. To support that separate choice requires, in addition,
some reason to believe that the framers had some comparative advantage over future Senates in choosing the outsider who should preside.
The same problem afflicts a second argument for constitutionalizing the presiding officer's identity, an argument articulated by early
commentators but not during the Convention itself. On this view, state
jealousies made it imperative that the presiding office be held by an
impartial outsider. Senators, elected by state legislatures, were to be
national representatives of the states; the vice president, although a
citizen of some state, was not elected from any state in particular, and
would be able to preside over the Senate without the appearance of
sectional favoritism. "2 (On this view, the House could be given authority to choose officers from among its own membership, who represent
districts, not states.) The impartiality argument accords with Bentham's idea that "[i]n a numerous legislative assembly, a president
ought not be a member," an "exclusion" that is in part intended "to
guarantee him from the seductions of partiality, and to raise him even
above suspicion, by never exhibiting him as a partisanin the midst of
debates in which he is required to interfere as a judge.""'
But the non sequitur problem remains: the argument from impartiality does not entail that the outsider should be chosen by constitutional framers. Bentham correctly distinguished the two points by
stipulating both that the presiding officer should be an outsider, and
also should be chosen "freely and exclusively by the assembly over
which he is to preside. '"4 These two stipulations might appear inconsistent because the exclusion of members from the presiding office
curtails the members' free choice of a presiding officer, but this objection is implausible. Generally, choice remains free despite the presence of legal constraints, and under any imaginable design, the members would be forced to choose their presiding officer within some set
of constitutional constraints, such as the Article VI requirement that
all federal officers take an oath to support the Constitution. "' A more
respectable, because more pragmatic, argument for the Convention's
decision to choose the identity of the presiding officer is that the very

112 See id at 514-15 (explaining the motivation for appointing the Senate's presiding officer
as "founded upon state jealousy, and state equality").
13 Bentham, PoliticalTactics ch V, § 2 at 67-69 (cited in note 11).
114 Id § 3 at 69.
115 US Const Art VI, cl 3 ("The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the
United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution.").
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state rivalries that require an outsider to preside would also prevent
the Senate itself from reaching a consensus on the identity of that outsider. Yet we might also imagine that the necessity for compromise
would have caused the Senate to choose the lowest common denominator from among the candidates presented, settling upon a presiding
officer inoffensive to all concerned. That has historically been the pattern in the Senate's choice of the president pro tempore, who presides
in the vice president's absence.
Even if the Convention had good reason to choose the identity of
the outsider given authority to preside, rather than leaving the choice
to future Senates, it was a separate and equally contestable decision to
mandate that the presiding outsider be a high official in the executive
branch. The mandated choice of an outsider compromises legislative
autonomy in the service of impartiality, but the mandate that the outsider be an executive officer adds the usual risk of aggrandizement by
institutional competitors. As Elbridge Gerry put it at the Convention,
"[w]e might as well put the President himself at the head of the Legislature. The close intimacy that must subsist between the President &
vice-president makes it absolutely improper.' "'" Morris's memorable
response was that "[tihe vice president then will be the first heir apparent that ever loved his father"; "7 in general, many framers anticipated that the president and vice president would be institutional rivals, rather than allies, in part because of the latter's perpetual hope of
succeeding the former, in part because the two officers were to be selected independently, and in part because each was anticipated to be
drawn from among the nation's leading politicians."' On this view, the
Senate would have little to fear from the vice president's status as presiding officer.
The risk of interbranch aggression created by the vice president's
constitutional role has indeed never materialized, "'' but not for the
reasons the framers envisaged. The vice president's structural rivalry
with the president has become a minor theme, because the enactment
Farrand. ed. 2 Federal Convention at 536-37 (cited in note 19).
Idat537.
118 This rivalry suggests a rationale for the rule that the chief justice, rather than the vice
president, would preside over the impeachment trial of a president. The concern might be. not
that the vice president would be biased in the president's favor, but that he would be biased
against him.
1i1 It is. however, a mistake to think that the vice president's role is vestigial or a historical
curiosity: recurrently, if infrequently, the vice president's authority to make procedural rulings
importantly affects legislative outcomes, and the tiebreaking vote is a significant power. See
Floyd M. Riddick, Senate Parliamentarian. Interview No 4. Filibuster and Cloture 39 (discussing
Vice President Rockefeller's controversial ruling on a point of order motion by Senator Mansfield involving a cloture motion), online at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistorylhistory/
resources/pdf/Riddick interview_4.pdf (visited Mar 15, 2004); 1 Guide to Congress 456 (CQ
Press 5th ed 2000).
116
'17
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of the Twelfth Amendment and the rise of joint party slates for the
two offices made the vice president a nonentity in the nineteenth century,2" while the consolidation of presidential power to nominate the
vice president made the office a wholly owned subsidiary of the presidency in the twentieth. 2 ' These developments might have posed a real
risk of presidential domination of the Senate, if the Senate had not
developed various means of self-defense, such as Senate precedents
suggesting that the vice president may act only as directed by the Senate's own rules and lacks any intrinsic constitutional authority to keep
order or to make procedural rulings.'22 The framers were wrong about
the political mechanisms that have dampened the risks created by
their choice of the Senate's presiding officer; the benign outcome of
their choice is best described as a lucky historical accident.
Finally, we need to consider Bentham's argument that an appropriately impartial presiding officer would possess no right to vote,
even to break ties.'2 Indeed, for Bentham, the rule authorizing the
presiding officer to vote only to break ties "is more opposed to impartiality than that of allowing him to vote in all cases.' 2. On this view, the
framers' decision to grant the vice president a tiebreaking vote undermines the impartiality rationale that best justifies his status as a
senatorial officer to begin with, and this is so whether the alternative
is full voting rights' or no vote at all. The mechanism that Bentham
has in mind here is, however, obscure; why should voting only to break

120 See Joel K. Goldstein, The Modern American Vice Presidency 5-8 (Princeton 1982) (discussing the "sharp decline" in the caliber of the vice presidents in the nineteenth century and the
"consolation prize" status of the office).
121 Id at 141 (noting that the "the functions of the vice-presidential candidate were echo, defender of the standard-bearer, and attacker of opponents," and that these duties continued in office).
122 See Currie, Federalist Period at 11 (cited in note 88) (describing Vice President Adams's
active participation in Senate affairs);Tiefer, Congressional Practice at 490 n 61 (cited in note 71)
(discussing a failed experiment allowing the vice president as speaker to select all committees,
until such biased choices were made that the Senate took the power away).
123 Alexander Hamilton argued that the Senate, necessarily composed of an even number
of legislators, would be incapable of "definitive resolution" in all cases unless the vice president
possessed a casting vote. Federalist 68 (Hamilton), in The Federalist 457, 461 (cited in note 25).
This is just wrong. As Bentham points out, in case of a tie the decision may be relegated to a default rule; the typical default in assemblies is that in case of a tie the motion is defeated. See Bentham, Political Tactics ch V, § 2 at 67-69 (cited in note 11). A tie vote may occur either where the
presiding officer has no casting vote, and thus possesses less voting power than the vice president, or where the presiding officer may vote not only to break ties but also to create a tie, and
thus possesses greater voting power than the vice president, who has no general power to cast a
decisive tie-creating vote. See Henry M. Robert, ed, Robert's Rules of Order 392 (Perseus 10th ed
2000).
124 Bentham, Political Tactics ch V, § 2 at 69 (cited in note 11).
125 An intermediate alternative would have been to give the vice president the power either
to break a tie or to create one, but not to cast nondecisive votes. See Robert, ed, Robert's Rules of
Order at 392 (cited in note 123).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:361

ties create a greater appearance of partiality than casting both tiebreaking votes and ordinary ones? Recall that on Story's view the latter regime in effect doubles the partisan import of the vice president's
vote. We may, however, save Bentham's argument by interpreting it in
expressive rather than consequentialist terms, as a claim that the tiebreak-only regime creates an inconsistent symbolism. On this view, the
abstention from ordinary voting in the tiebreak-only regime creates a
pretense of impartiality that is violated whenever a tiebreaking vote is
cast, whereas the regime that includes ordinary voting makes no pretense that the presiding officer is impartial in the first place.
The upshot of all this is that the framers' decisions to foist the
vice president upon the Senate and to give the vice president (only) a
tiebreaking vote both seem dubious from the standpoint of sound
constitutional design. What is worse, the former decision may also
have been unnecessary. The simpler solution to the problem of vice
presidential unemployment, if it is a problem at all, would have been
to mandate, not that he be given a legislative post, but that he be given
additional executive duties2 -perhaps as one of the "Heads of De-

partments" or cabinet officers, perhaps as one of the "Ambassadors,
other public Ministers [or] Consuls," the existence of which are presupposed by Article 11.27 Such an arrangement would have eliminated
the institutional risks of interbranch service. And, as it turns out, subordinate executive and diplomatic tasks are what vice presidents
mostly do anyway.""
4. Voting rules and quorum rules.
Article I sets the basic quorum rule for congressional voting by
providing that: "a Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum
to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day,
and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members,
in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may
provide."2

126 Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 Mich L Rev
1703, 1714 (1988) (suggesting that the vice president's "role as presiding officer of the Senate
should be eliminated" and that the vice president should be allowed to hold other offices in the
executive branch). For a critical response to this proposal, see Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice-Presidency, 30 Wake Forest L Rev 505, 556-57 (1995) (arguing that additional vice
presidential duties may put the vice president "in a position where he would likely accumulate
enemies and be mired in detail").
127 See US Const Art Il,§ 2,cl 2.
128 See Goldstein. 30 Wake Forest L Rev at 556-57 (cited in note 126) ("Successful recent
Vice Presidents, like Mondale, Bush, or Gore have been generalists who have been free to dabble in the range of problems that government, and a President, faces.").
129 USConstArt I,§5,cl 1.
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In the ordinary case of simple majority voting, this provision is
straightforward enough. An important interpretive question arises.
however, when the Constitution specifies that a supermajority vote is
needed to execute some power vested in one or both houses separately, such as the expulsion of a member or the approval of a treaty,
or in the Congress jointly, such as the override of a presidential veto.
Does the heightened voting requirement mean that a supermajority of
the whole house is needed, or is only a supermajority of a majority
needed? Although this question is sometimes thought to implicate the
constitutional quorum rule,"" it does not. Whatever the voting rule, a
quorum to do business is present if and only if a majority of the relevant house is present. The possibility that a supermajority requirement
is satisfied only if a supermajority of the whole house votes in favor of
a bill is an interpretation of the voting rule itself. Quorum rules, by
contrast, are insensitive to whether votes are cast for or against a bill;
a quorum can be composed of both aye votes and no votes. Nonetheless I will treat this question under the slightly misleading head of
"supermajority quorum rules," to follow previous discussions and as a
useful shorthand.
I shall begin by examining the ordinary quorum rule from the
standpoint of optimal legislative design, and will then show that the
question of supermajority quorum rules lacks independent significance; it collapses entirely into the question of optimal voting rules.
a) Ordinary quorum rules. Define a "quorum rule" as any rule
that permits the legislature to conduct business with less than all
members present. What effects are produced as the quorum rule is decreased from the full number of members down to one member? In
general, where the underlying voting rule is enactment by simple majority, there will be strong pressure to adopt a majority quorum requirement as well. If a minority cannot defeat an enactment on the
merits, the intuition runs, why should the same minority be able to
block an enactment by absenting themselves and thereby breaking the
quorum? Conversely, with a high quorum rule, such as three-fourths
majority, a handful of legislators may extract strategic concessions by
threatening to prevent a majority from enacting its preferred policy.
As Gouvernor Morris observed at the Convention:
the Secession of a small number ought not to be suffered to
break a quorum.... Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up
a quorum, they may seize a moment when a particular [part] of

130 See Currie, Federalist Period at 208 n 13 (cited in note 88).
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the Continent may be in need of immediate aid, to extort, by
threatening a secession, some unjust & selfish measure."'
The costs of organizing this sort of holdout faction to break the quorum rise as the quorum rule is reduced.
To be sure, empowering minorities to defeat legislation by breaking the quorum will in some cases also reduce majoritarian exploitation. George Mason "admitted that inconveniences might spring from
the secession of a small number: but he had also known good produced by an apprehension of it. He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia." 13 The combination of this point with
the previous one just means that high quorum requirements display
the same mix of costs and benefits as supermajority voting rules; indeed, the voting rule sets an effective upper bound on the quorum requirement. Given these considerations, the combination of simple majority voting rules with supermajority quorum requirements is rare in
state and foreign constitutions.'3
The harder question is why there should be a lower bound, or indeed any quorum requirement at all. Following Bentham, we may
identify three principal costs that may be incurred when legislatures
proceed with business despite high rates of absenteeism.' The first
cost is outcome error,defined as any difference between the outcomes
that the legislature would produce with full attendance and the outcomes it would produce with a bare quorum present. Low attendance
increases the variance of legislative outcomes and thus the possibility
of countermajoritarian results. One ambition of quorum rules is to
minimize this form of error by ensuring that the legislature may not
proceed with only a few in attendance. A second cost is the loss of legitimacy said to result when the legislature proceeds without a full
complement or even majority participation. As Bentham put it, "[i]s
the part absent greater than that which is present? The public knows
not to which to adhere. In every state of the case, the incomplete assembly will have less influence than the complete assembly.'". A third
cost is the deliberativedeficit produced by low attendance. On a Condorcetian interpretation of legislative deliberation, any reduction in
the number voting reduces the probability that the eventual majority's
decision is correct, so long as each legislator is more likely to be right
than wrong, and where there are right (and wrong) answers to be
Farrand, ed,2 Federal Convention at 252 (cited in note 19) (brackets in original).
Id.
But see Ind Const Art IV,§ 11 ("Two-thirds of each House shall constitute a quorum to
do business.").
134 This compresses Bentham's six principal costs. See Bentham, Political Tactics ch
IV. § 4
at 57-58 (cited in note 11).
135 Idat 58.
131
132
133
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found."fi Even where the subject for legislative deliberation involves
value choices, more heads may still be better than fewer, if exposure to
a broader number and variety
37 of views blocks group polarization and
dampens opinion cascades.'
To be sure, if attendance is optional then self-selection may ensure that the attending legislators are precisely those most informed
and most engaged on the relevant subjects, and this may be the best
subset of deliberators available. Yet against this optimistic story is the
possibility that self-selected attendees will hold extreme preferences
or biased views; legislators with lower stakes in outcomes may prove
more dispassionate deliberators, albeit less informed ones. Conversely,
legislators' willingness to invest in the information needed to cast an
intelligent vote may itself be a product of attending the legislature, so
that legislators induced to attend by quorum rules or other institutional reasons, rather than by the stakes or intrinsic interest of the subject matter, might fear to be seen casting an obviously uninformed
vote. They might thus learn enough to form a reasonably defensible
view, or at least to decide intelligently which other legislator's position
should be copied.
It is tempting to think that the outcome errors produced by low
attendance are harmless. The legislative majority that would have prevailed with full attendance may, on this view, simply repeal the minoritarian enactment the next time it assembles, and the minority, anticipating this, will refrain from the useless exercise. As Bentham described parliamentary practice, "[i]f the decision taken by the small
number be contrary to the wish of the majority, they assemble in force
the day following, and abrogate the work of the previous day."'' The
ability to reverse minoritarian legislative action functions as an ultimate constraint that reduces the importance of the quorum minimum,
a point missed by George Mason when he argued to the Convention

The Condorcet Jury Theorem "holds that a majority vote among a suitably large body of
voters, all of whom are more likely than not to vote correctly, will almost surely result in the correct outcome." Paul Edelman, On Legal Interpretations of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 31 J Legal Stud 327, 327 (2002). For applications of the theorem to legislative deliberation and voting.
see Jeremy Waldron, Legislators* Intentions and Unintentional Legislation. in Andrei Marmor. ed.
Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy 329.344-46,350-51 (Oxford 1995).
137 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes. 110 Yale L J
71. 108-09 (2000) (showing that heterogeneity of views in the deliberating body dampens group
polarization). Several European constitutions do not require a quorum for deliberation, as opposed to voting. See, for example, Spain Const Part Ill, ch 1. § 72, online at http://www.ecln.net/
elements/euroconstitutions.html (visited Feb 20, 2004). But establishing a quorum for voting
may nonetheless have valuable indirect effects on deliberation, and it is far easier to monitor
compliance with quorum rules for voting than for deliberation.
138 Bentham, Political Tactics ch IV. § 7 at 62 (cited in note 11).
136
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that without a quorum minimum "the U[nited] States might be governed by a Juncto..'..
Yet the constraint is a weak one, and may fail on either de jure or
de facto grounds. If the legal regime permits the legislature to enact
entrenched statutes, irrepealable by later legislative enactments (although not by constitutional amendment), then the legislative minority's initial act may stand. Moreover, in Parliament and in some
states, constitutional or quasi-constitutional traditions or rules bar reconsideration of rejected bills within the same legislative session,
based on a general rule that "the same question should not be twice
offered" within that session.' If these rules are interpreted expansively, so that the earlier enactment is deemed a rejection of the opposite proposal, they may preclude intra-session reversals. Even if the legal regime neither permits entrenchment nor bars reversals within the
session, it may be more difficult for the legislative majority to repeal
an earlier minoritarian enactment than it would have been to vote it
down in the first instance, even if the enactment has only been law for
a brief period. The change in the status quo point may affect outcomes
if some legislators support neither the enactment nor its repeal, perhaps because they desire to use that portion of the legislative agenda
to pursue other business entirely. An implication of these considerations is that constitutions that permit entrenching statutes or that bar
reconsideration of enactments within the same legislative session
should, all else equal, have higher legislative quorum requirements
than constitutions that do not-subject to a qualification to be discussed below.
Bentham also goes wrong by saying that "every proposition the
success of which has resulted from absence, and which would have
been rejected in the full assembly" should be counted as a "surprise......
With rational expectations, however, absentees will anticipate that diminished attendance increases the variance of legislative outcomes
and thus the possibility of results that contradict the preferences of
the legislative majority. The result may, however, surprise the public if
monitoring of absenteeism is imperfect. Moreover, in two-party systems, error in Bentham's sense occurs only when there is asymmetrical
absenteeism, such that the absentees from the party that would prevail
Farrand, ed. 2 Federal Convention at 252 (cited in note 19).
See generally Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 Yale L J 1665 (2002).
141 See Thomas Erskine May, Erskine May's Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings; and
Usage of Parliament557-58 (Butterworth 17th ed 1964) ("When a bill has been rejected, or lost
through disagreement, it should not, according to the practice of Parliament, be reintroduced in
the same session."). See, for example. Tenn Const Art II, § 19 ("After a bill has been rejected, no
bill containing the same substance shall be passed into a law during the same session.").
142 See Bentham. Political Tactics ch IV, § 4 at 58 (cited in note 11).
139

140
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with full attendance are sufficiently more numerous than the absentees from the minority party as to reverse the outcome. The modern
Senate has evolved a complex norm to reduce the error costs of
asymmetrical absenteeism: the pair system, under which senators form
agreements with members of the other party not to vote if one is absent. Although the pair system makes the senators immediately concerned better off by permitting symmetrical absences, it possibly creates an externality by increasing absenteeism and thereby detracting
from legislative deliberation. We will return to this concern below.
Against the foregoing benefits of quorum rules must be set their
principal cost, which is to block legislative action. Here, too, quorum
rules resemble supermajority rules in their common bias in favor of
the status quo. A less obvious complication is that attendance may itself be an endogenous effect of the quorum rule, at least in part. As
Gouvernor Morris brilliantly argued at the Convention, "fix the [quorum] number low and they [that is, legislators] will generally attend
knowing that advantage may be taken of their absence."'. To the extent that this rational-expectations account is persuasive, increasing,
rather than decreasing, the harms that legislative minorities may inflict
by opportunistic action in the legislative majority's absence will
maximize the expected costs of failure to attend and thereby maximize attendance. On this view, legal regimes that permit entrenching
statutes, that bar intra-session reversals, and so forth should have
lower quorum requirements, not higher ones. But the flaw in this position is that maximizing attendance is an implausible aim; some absences are strategic, but some are justified, so the right maximand is
not attendance simpliciter but attendance without good excuse.
Quorum rules are not, of course, the only rules that affect attendance. Two bther variables that have indirect effects on attendance are
the transparency of legislative proceedings and the permissibility of
proxy voting, either in committee or on the floor. The publication of
roll call votes encourages attendance if absenteeism has political costs;
there is some empirical evidence for this.'" I examine transparency
and its effects below. As for the second issue, proxy voting has never
been permissible on the floor of either house; it was largely abolished
in House committees in 1995, although it continues in Senate committees and in intercameral conferences.' Although the permissibility of
proxies affects attendance, it does not follow that the proxy rules can
or should be calibrated with the sole aim of optimizing attendance. Although proxies lower the costs of absenteeism, and thus reinforce the
143 Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 252 (cited in note 19) (moving to fix the quorum at
a majority).
144 See note 177 (providing empirical evidence for politically motivated attendance).
145 1 Guide to Congress at 552-53 (cited in note 119).
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deliberative externality discussed earlier, proxy voting also bolsters
majoritarianism, "ensuring that political control could not slip away to
a well-organized minority that might concentrate its strength at a single location for a 'sneak attack' on the majority."'' 6 Maximizing attendance prevents countermajoritarian surprise, but if less than full attendance is a given, a ban on proxy voting may undermine majoritarian control.
Jiggering the quorum rules, transparency rules, and rules about
proxy voting so as indirectly to maximize or optimize attendance thus
looks like a difficult and potentially counterproductive enterprise. The
more straightforward procedure may simply be to establish penalties
for nonattendance by statute or internal rule. Almost all jurisdictions
thus permit a minority smaller than a quorum to enact rules and set
penalties to compel attendance by absent legislators, and Bentham
proposed an intricate system under which absentees would suffer an
automatic deduction from salaries or deposited funds. ' Yet in many
jurisdictions such rules go largely unenforced, not (or not only) because of collusion between the enforcing legislative officers and the
offending legislators, but because of the undesirable side effects of a
compulsory regime. Mandating a fine for nonattendance may implicitly announce that "a fine is a price," and thereby undermine, rather
49
than reinforce, social norms that support legislative attendance.'
Moreover, if legislators differ widely in personal wealth, as they do in
the House of Representatives, then a system of fines might produce
(in Bentham's words) "two classes in the assembly-those who were
paid for their functions, and those who paid for not fulfilling them.'...
Bentham fell back on the idea that attendance might be enforced by
criminal sanctions, but this seems implausible, given quasiconstitutional traditions of legislators' personal immunity and the high
procedural costs of disproving legislators' stock excuses. Finally, compelling attendance is inadequate to prevent strategic quorum-breaking
if the quorum is determined by the number of votes cast on a roll call
(the traditional practice), and if the minority may attend the legislature without casting votes. In the nineteenth century, strategic refusal
to vote was frequently used as a delaying tactic, and was suppressed
only in 1890, thanks to a ruling by the Speaker of the House that

146 Id at 552.
147 Bentham, Political Tactics ch IV § 5 at 58 (cited in note 11).
148 See Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price. 29 J Legal Stud 1, 1 (2000) (de-

scribing how fines may increase the frequency of harmful behavior by crowding out informal social sanctions).
149 Bentham. Political Tactics ch IV, § 5 at 59 (cited in note 11).
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members physically present but not voting counted toward a
quorum.
Given that optimizing attendance through direct regulation is as
problematic as the indirect regulation that animates quorum rules,
most jurisdictions parallel (or copy) the federal Constitution by adopting a mix of the two strategies, prescribing quorum minima within a
narrow range (typically a majority, occasionally two-thirds), and conferring legislative authority to compel attendance. On this score the
framers seem to have gotten things about right, at least if we ignore
their failure to anticipate strategic refusals to vote, and at least in the
sense that no strikingly superior alternatives to their major design
choices exist.
b) Supermajority "quorum" rules. The framers, however, blun-

dered by leaving open the critical interpretive question whether the
express majority quorum for ordinary majority voting still obtains
where the Constitution requires a supermajority of the votes cast. The
constitutional text is ambiguous on the question of supermajority quorum rules. In several places, including the supermajority rules for treaties and impeachment, the framers pointedly provided that a supermajority vote "of the members present" would suffice;.' this suggests by
negative implication that in other settings, such as the supermajority
requirements for veto overrides or constitutional amendments, twothirds of the whole membership of each house is required."2 Against
this interpretation is the idea that where the framers wanted to vary
the ordinary quorum rule, they did so expressly. An example is the Article II procedure by which the House of Representatives chooses the
president; the framers provided that "[a] quorum for this Purpose
shall consist of a Member or Members from two-thirds of the States,"
even though (only) "a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a
Choice."''. That the framers required a supermajority in a particular
setting need not entail an implicit decision to require a supermajority
of the whole body, rather than simply a supermajority of a majority
quorum. In settings that expressly require a supermajority vote yet are
silent about quorum rules, "the Framers expressly changed the multi150 See William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation 131-34 (Yale 1986). A recent redistricting controversy in Texas involved an escalated version of this same tactic. To stymie the
Texas legislature's Republican majority's efforts to adopt a congressional redistricting plan,
Texas Democrats twice broke the quorum by fleeing the state, evading Texas Rangers who were
ordered to return the absent legislators to the capitol. Ralph Blumenthal, After Bitter Fight,
Texas Senate Redraws Congressional Districts,NY Times Al (Oct 13, 2003); David Barboza and
Charles Hulse, Texas' Republicans Fume; Democrats Remain AWOL, NY Times A17 (May 14,
2003).
151 US Const Art II. § 2, cl 2 (treaties); US Const Art I, § 3, cl 6 (impeachments).
152 See US Const Art I, § 7, cl 2 (veto overrides); US Const Art V (amendments).
153 US Const Art II, § 1,cl 3.
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plier [from majority to supermajority] for determining the requisite
majority; there was no reason to think they had also changed the multiplicand [from majority quorum to full house]."'
The stakes of the issue are high. In a house comprising one hundred legislators a majority of a majority (the ordinary quorum rule)
requires only twenty-six votes, a two-thirds supermajority of a majority requires thirty-four votes, and a two-thirds supermajority of the
whole requires as many as sixty-six votes. The difference between the
second and third thresholds is far greater than the difference between
the second and first. In light of the foregoing analysis, however, this interpretive question is easily resolved on consequentialist grounds. The
principal constraint on supermajority quorum rules is the ubiquity of
the simple majority voting rule, and this constraint disappears when
the underlying voting rule is itself supermajoritarian. Nor, of course, is
the indirect effect of quorum rules on legislative attendance an important consideration here. A quorum must be present whether supermajority requirements are interpreted to require a supermajority of the
whole house, or just a supermajority of a majority. In the absence of
those considerations, the topic of the optimal multiplicand for supermajority voting rules collapses entirely into the topic of optimal voting
rules themselves. Increasing the multiplicand is in principle equivalent
to increasing the requisite supermajority. So from the consequentialist
standpoint the issue is parasitic on the familiar debate over the costs
and benefits of supermajority rules,' a topic that I need not rehash
here.
5. Transparency (of deliberation and voting).
Among the most significant of Article I's provisions regulating
congressional procedure is the Journal Clause, which provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in
their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the
Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of
one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.'6
This provision makes a number of fundamental design choices:
for open voting rather than the secret ballot in Congress, at least as to
some matters and on the request of a minority of legislators;"' for a
154 Currie, Jeffersonians at 62 (cited in note 83).
155 See McGinnis and Rappaport, 80 Tex L Rev at 707-08 (cited in note 6) (discussing the

costs and benefits of supermajority rules).
156 US Const Art I, § 5. cl 3.
157 Note that the Clause requires only one-fifth "of those present" to trigger a roll call vote,
not one-fifth of a quorum. But in the Senate (not the House). the practice is for the presiding of-
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default obligation to publish a journal of proceedings; and for an optional override of the transparency obligation in defined circum-

stances. Equally important are the design possibilities the Clause rejects, and that are present in constitutions of other jurisdictions, such
as constitutionally mandated roll call voting in legislative committees "'

and a public right of physical access to legislative proceedings."' To
understand the stakes, consider that throughout most of its history the
English Parliament operated in secrecy and indeed punished attempts
to publish records of its proceedings,"' that the Continental Congress
initially closed its proceedings to outsiders 6' and the Constitutional
Convention did so throughout,6 ' and that even today most legislatures
use secret ballots to select their officers 6 3 while some, like the Italian
Parliament, have until quite recently used them for final voting on
legislation.' The transparency of legislative deliberation and voting is
in broad historical compass a recent design innovation, and a normatively controversial one, or so I shall argue. There are many good reasons for citizens and legislators to fear the effects of transparency on

legislatures, and if we ultimately approve of the major thrust of the
framers' design choices along this margin-as I will-we should do so
with full awareness of the institutional costs of those choices.
I will break down this complex topic into three parts. The first
sketches briefly the general tradeoffs inherent in legislative transparency; the second turns to the question of open versus secret voting,
examining the purposes, scope, and mechanics of the Journal Clause's
roll call provision; and the third examines constitutional mandates

ficer to assume that a quorum is present until it is otherwise determined. See Senate Rule VI, cl
3. Under that assumption, to trigger a roll call vote requires at least eleven Senators (one-fifth of
a quorum of fifty-one, rounding up), which may often be more than one-fifth of those actually
present. See Tiefer, Congressional Practice at 530-31 (cited in note 71). Under senatorial courtesy, however, the leadership will often help members to arrange a desired roll call. Id at 533.
158 See, for example, Mich Const Art IV, § 17 ("On all actions on bills and resolutions in
each committee, names and votes of members shall be recorded."); Mont Const Art V, § 11.2
("Every vote of each member of the legislature on each substantive question in the legislature, in
any committee, or in committee of the whole shall be recorded and made public.").
159 See, for example, Idaho Const Art III, § 12 ("The business of each house, and of the
committee of the whole shall be transacted openly and not in secret session."); Iowa Const Art
III, § 13 ("The doors of each house shall be open, except on such occasions, as, in the opinion of
the house, may require secrecy.").
160 See G.H. Jennings, An Anecdotal History of the British Parliamentfrom the EarliestPeriods 559 (Horace Cox 4th ed 1899).
161 See Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress 67 (Norton 1964).
162 See Farrand, ed, 1 FederalConvention at xi-xxv (cited in note 30).
163 See Valentine Herman and Franqoise Mendel, Parliaments of the World: A Reference
Compendium 400 (De Gruyter 1976).
164 See Carol Mershon, The Costs of Coalition:Coalition Theories and Italian Governments,
90Am Pol Sci Rev 545 (1996).
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that require roll calls for certain votes (rather than merely allowing a
set fraction of legislators to require them).
a) Transparency,deliberation, and bargaining. At a general

level, the institutional-design tradeoffs inherent in transparency are
well understood," although it is a daunting empirical task to specify
how the relevant variables should be weighed in particular settings.
Transparency reduces the cost to principals, such as citizens and voters,
of monitoring their agents, such as legislators, who would otherwise
divert resources to themselves or simply shirk their official duties. It is
thus a favored recipe of democrats and good-government reformers
who seek to reduce official corruption and to encourage regular attendance by legislators; we will see below that agents may even com-

pete among themselves by offering principals institutional arrangements that provide for ever-greater transparency.
This is all to the good as far as it goes, but transparency has im-

portant costs, in part precisely because of its democratizing effects;
transparency changes official and legislative deliberation both for
good and for ill. Without transparency, agents gain less from adopting
positions that resonate with immediate popular passions, so transparency may exacerbate the effects of decisionmaking pathologies that
sometimes grip mobilized publics." Transparency subjects public deliberation to reputational constraints: officials will stick to initial positions, once announced, for fear of appearing to vacillate or capitulate,
and this effect will make deliberation more polarized and more partisan. The framers closed the Philadelphia Convention to outsiders pre-

cisely to prevent initial positions from hardening prematurely.6"7
165

For discussions, see Elster, 2 U Pa J Const L at 410-12 (cited in note 14) (comparing the

results of a closed meeting rule at the Federal Convention with those of an open meeting rule at
the Assembl6e Constituante); Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 Yale L J 1311 (1999) (considering the costs and benefits of publicizing internal judicial discussions); Saul Levmore, The
Anonymity Tool, 144 U Pa L Rev 2191 (1996) (discussing anonymity in the context of legal and
social norms); David Luban, The Publicity Principle,in Robert Goodin, ed, The Theory of Institutional Design 154 (Cambridge 1996) (offering a qualified and conditional defense of the publicity
principle).
166 Many public pathologies are relevant here, including reputational and informational
cascades, preference falsification, rational and irrational herding behavior, and group polarization. See Sunstein, 10 J Pol Phil at 176 (cited in note 52) (discussing group polarization, where
"members of a deliberating group predictably move toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the members' predeliberation tendencies") (emphasis removed); Timur Kuran,
Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification(Harvard 1995)
(explaining the implications of preference falsification, "the act of misrepresenting one's genuine
wants under perceived social pressures"); Jacob Gersen, InformationalCascades, Cognitive Bias,
and Catastrophic Risk (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (exploring "the political
economy of catastrophic risk from natural disasters in the United States").
167 At the Federal Convention, the sessions were closed and secret. As Madison said later:
Had the members committed themselves publicly at first, they would have afterwards supposed consistency required them to maintain their ground, whereas by secret discussion no
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The pressure to take a principled public stand also dampens explicit bargaining. Although anticorruption reformers count this as an
unqualified good, it is in fact a qualified one.'" Bargains may represent
corrupt deals by which agents enrich themselves at principals' expense, but bargains also permit logrolls that may allow the legislative
process to register the intensity of constituents' preferences,'6" and that
help to appease policy losers by giving something to everyone. Argument by reference to public principle, by contrast, is a hydraulic force
that presses competing camps toward total victory or total defeat. Alternatively, transparency might simply drive decisionmaking underground, creating "deliberations" that are sham rituals while the real
bargaining is conducted in less accessible and less formal venues, off
the legislative floor or in closed committee markup sessions.
So transparency is a mixed boon; not coincidentally, the historical
and political record concerning legislative transparency presents a
mixed picture. It is best to examine that record in the focused setting
of particular constitutional questions, however. I shall begin with the
baseline roll call provisions applicable to ordinary voting, and then
move to constitutionally mandated roll calls for supermajority votes
and other special circumstances.
b) (Open) voting and (secret) ballots. An intuitive and widely
held view is that, in a representative democracy, legislative voting
must be publicized if citizen-voters are entitled or obliged to judge the
performance of their representatives through periodic elections. In
principal-agent terms, voters are the principals, legislators are the
agents, and constitutional provisions that force agents to publicize
their actions lower the monitoring costs that principals must incur,
thereby making principals better off. Secret voting, on this view, confines principals to monitoring or judging outcomes alone, rather than
both actions and outcomes. Rather than knowing both how elected
representatives voted and what the political and economic outcomes
of those votes were, voters are relegated to making reelection decisions solely on crude outcome-based proxies for successful government, such as the state of the economy or the voter's personal finances
at the time of election (or changes in either of those variables between
man felt himself obliged to retain his opinions any longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth, and was open to the force of argument.
Farrand, ed, 3 FederalConvention at 479 (cited in note 30).
168 See Elster. 2 U Pa J Const L at 405-18 (cited in note 14).
169 Logrolling may permit, of course, either socially beneficial trades or the infliction of socially harmful externalities on nontraders. Much depends on the details of the situation. "Today,
no consensus exists in the normative public choice literature as to whether logrolling is on net
welfare enhancing or welfare reducing, that is, whether logrolling constitutes a positive- or a
negative-sum game." Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in Dennis C. Mueller, ed, Perspectives on
Public Choice:A Handbook 322,322 (Cambridge 1997).
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the last election and the current one). Secret voting, it might be said,
simply throws away information about legislators' actions, or legislative inputs, that is of value to citizen-principals.
The framers were quite aware of this principal-agent account, at
least in its simplest outlines. Wilson argued in the Convention that
"[tihe people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or
have done, and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to
conceal their proceedings."..7 Formally, of course, the Journal Clause
does allow a sufficient supermajority of the legislature (four-fifths plus
one) to do just that, by refusing roll call votes and by closing the legislative journals to public scrutiny (the latter simply on a majority
vote).'7 ' Yet we may surmise that the framers anticipated that competition between legislative factions would routinely produce public voting, as indeed it has done. Congress as an institution (although not
voters) might be better off if all legislators, in both houses, could agree
to enforce strict secrecy provisions, but competition among legislators
and candidates produces socially beneficial transparency.
As this last point emphasizes, where present or would-be legislators compete to achieve or retain office, modern accounts of the principal-agent relationship between voters and legislators have emphasized the benefits to legislator-agents themselves of reducing the costs
of monitoring to principals. 2 By offering contracts or arrangements
that lower expected agency costs, either by reducing monitoring costs
or in other ways, would-be agents induce principals to select them
rather than others. Would-be agents also increase the discretionary
power with which principals will entrust them; the lower the costs of
monitoring, the lower the risk that the agent will shirk or will divert
power to his own ends rather than the principal's, and the more power
the agent will receive. These effects may of course operate through the
mediation of political parties, rather than through the decisions of individual legislators. Parties will oppose secret voting to the extent that
it reduces their ability to monitor their members' behavior and thus
credibly to offer the electorate attractive policy packages. Consider
170 Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 260 (cited in note 19).
171 An ingenious, or diabolical, interpretation might emphasize that the roll call provision
merely requires that "the Yeas and Nays ... shall, at the desire of one fifth of those Present, be
entered on the Journal," and that a bare majority might subsequently decline to publish that
"Part" of the Journal, deciding that "in their Judgment [it] require[s] Secrecy." US Const Art I,
§ 5. But this would essentially nullify the submajority one-fifth requirement for forcing a roll call,
in violation of standard canons of textual interpretation that bar interpreting one proviso to
swallow or negate another. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as
Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 27, 99 (1994). So the better interpretation is that the roll call provision trumps the secrecy option provided in the Clause; roll calls must be published. To my
knowledge neither house has ever refused to publish a roll call vote.
172 This paragraph and the next draw heavily upon the important account in Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority at 133 (cited in note 8).
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the Italian Parliament, which uniquely among major liberal democracies had a regular, although complex, practice of secret voting until
1988, when the major political parties cooperated to abolish the practice as a means of asserting greater control over their own rank and

file. 173
In historical terms, we may interpret these points as suggesting
two hypotheses: (1) that constitutional framers who wish to strengthen
government power will propose constitutionally mandated rules of
governmental transparency to induce popular ratification; (2) that
subsequent elections under the new constitution may bring about increased transparency through voluntary legislative action, as competing candidates and competing houses of the legislature bid for popular
support by proposing institutional policies that reduce the voters'
monitoring costs. Both suggestions resonate with the historical evidence. As to the first, framers who advocated mandatory transparency
of congressional deliberation and voting did so with the explicit recognition that encoding transparency in the constitutional bargain
would help to dispel antifederalist concerns about the power of the
new national government. Wilson, after arguing that the people had a
right to know the actions of their legislative agents, added that "as this
is a clause in the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which weak &
suspicious minds would be easily misled. '71 As to the second, the Senate's decision to proceed behind closed doors for the first years of its
existence, and to limit publication of its debates and votes, caused
popular interest to center on the House; by 1801 the Senate was bidding for popular attention by opening its proceedings to the public.'
Subsequent developments in congressional procedure extend the
story. Modern legislators have imposed transparency obligations on
themselves, such as roll call voting in congressional committees, with a
view to encouraging attendance and dispelling popular suspicion of
legislative corruption." Furthermore, some empirical evidence suggests that transparency obligations do at least hamper shirking by allowing7 7 opposing candidates to publicize incumbents' attendance records.
173 See Mershon, 90 Am Pol Sci Rev at 545 (cited in note 164).

Farrand,ed,2 Federal Convention at 260 (cited in note 19).
See Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority at 138-39 (cited in note 8) ("Indeed, within a
very few years, the Senate itself was transformed from a closed council to a highly public showcase of the rhetorical talents of the leading orators of the day.").
176 Id at 139.
177 See, for example, id ("For example, following the institution [of] recorded teller voting,
attendance at roll calls roughly doubled. Similarly, when roll call votes began to be recorded in
committees, participation on roll calls increased from around 40% to over 90%."); David M. Olson, The Legislative Process: A Comparative Approach 392-93 (Harper 1980). See also Bruce
174
175
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So far the story is a happy or at least a straightforward one. We
may complicate it by examining reasons that might give legislators
good reason to fear the consequences of the transparency of legislative voting, and that might even cause their voter-principals to agree
that public voting has important costs as well as benefits. From the legislators' point of view, a major historical concern is that the executive
branch will punish them for voting contrary to executive interests; the
fear of monarchical influence animated Parliament's elaborate attempts to maintain the secrecy of its proceedings during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. " " From the social standpoint, voterprincipals might well approve of the legislature's attempts to shield itself from executive-branch coercion. If the constitutional design seeks
to minimize agency costs in part by creating institutional competition
between branches, then executive aggrandizement and consequent
domination of the legislature enabled by legislative transparency increases those costs.
Yet legislative secrecy may itself be an unnecessarily costly response to the threat, because it also deprives voters of valuable information about their agents' behavior. We might then understand the
Speech and Debate Clause as an institutional-design device that
promises an alternative, and less costly, means of dampening executive
aggrandizement. The Clause provides that "for any Speech and Debate in either House, [legislators] shall not be questioned in any other
Place.' 7. Its historical purpose and most important function is to prevent the executive from using its control of prosecutorial power to
punish or, better yet, threaten to punish noncompliant legislators for
their words and actions. Whereas legislative secrecy indirectly protects
legislators from executive coercion by constricting the executive's information, the Speech and Debate Clause does so directly by constricting the executive's opportunities, thus allowing voter-principals
to use the information themselves while denying their executive
agents the ability to use it coercively. The Clause is an incomplete substitute for secrecy, because the executive may use carrots as well as
sticks, bribes as well as threats. Yet bribes are more expensive than
threats, since a credible threat that deters its targets from disobedience is costless if the threatener never has to incur the costs of actually punishing those targets. Moreover, the constitutional design independently restricts the executive's ability to bribe legislators along the

Bender and John R. Lott. Jr., Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature,
87 Pub Choice 67, 68 (1996) (observing that members in their final congressional terms have
higher rates of absenteeism).
178 See Jennings. History of the British Parliament at 559 (cited in note 160).
17) US Const Art I. § 6,cl 1.
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most obvious margins. Consider the Emoluments Clause '4 and the Incompatibility Clause,"" which together constrain, although they do not

eliminate, the form of executive bribery most familiar to the framers:
the offer of executive places or offices. The latter Clause bars legisla-

tors from simultaneous service in the executive branch, while the former limits the president's ability to appoint a legislator to a newly created or newly augmented executive post during the legislator's term of
service.

The fear of executive influence is a special case of a more general
problem: open voting allows legislators to give third parties credible -

because verifiable-commitments to vote in particular ways in return
for bribes or in response to threats. With secret voting, by contrast, legislators cannot strike credible vote-selling bargains with the executive
or interest groups, so the value of legislators' promised votes to those
groups declines.", 2 From the standpoint of voter-principals, the ability
of legislators to commit credibly to sell votes to interest groups represents an agency cost insofar as the interest groups' goals differ from

the voters'." To be sure, even with secret voting, interest groups may
pay for outcomes rather than actions by offering legislators payments
conditional on favorable legislative decisions. Yet interest groups can

always pay for outcomes, even with open voting, so secret voting at
least reduces the value of the legislator's vote by removing one di-

mension over which bargains can be struck. And paying legislators for
legislative outcomes is senseless unless interest groups can identify the
swing or marginal legislators, who alone control outcomes anyway. But
the interest groups' ability to identify swing legislators is endogenous

to the voting practice; with secret voting, any legislator may claim to
be marginal in order to win an interest-group payment, but no such
claims will be credible.
There is an illuminating comparison here to voting in general
elections, which was usually open during the nineteenth century but is

18() US Const Art I, § 6, cl 2 ("No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which
shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such
time.").
1i8 Id ("[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.").
182 Luban, Publicity Principle at 187 (cited in note 165) (citing Senator Robert Packwood).
183 Whether an open market in votes provides legislators themselves any benefit is a separate question. As Ferejohn points out, ex ante competition between candidates for legislative office may dissipate the rents that legislators could otherwise obtain from vote-selling. Ferejohn,
Accountability and Authority at 140 n 6 (cited in note 8). This effect merely reallocates rents from
legislators to their interest-group supporters; it does nothing to alleviate the agency loss to voters
of legislative vote-selling, and indeed exacerbates it insofar as increasing expenditures on (rentdissipating) competition between candidates is itself socially wasteful.
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today almost invariably secret.'. The switch produced important debates between advocates of open voting, who thought that secrecy
produced irresponsibility and corruption, and advocates of the secret
ballot, who argued, among other things, that secrecy would diminish
electoral corruption and extortion by rendering noncredible voters'
promises to sell votes to party bosses or local grandees for implicit
payments, thereby reinforcing legal bans on explicit vote-selling. ' The
response to this latter claim by advocates of open voting was and is
that the sheer number of voters in general elections, and the infinitesimal chance of casting a decisive vote, ensure that the value of particular votes is too low to be worth buying; no voter can deliver a bloc
of votes as such. Whatever its merit, the argument emphasizes the far
greater value of legislative votes, and the far more serious worry about
third-party corruption in legislatures; after all, there are far fewer
votes to buy in a legislature, and each has a far more direct effect on
policy outcomes than general-election votes do.' Ignoring the loss of
information to voters that legislative secrecy produces, we might even
be surprised to find the pattern of secret voting in general elections
and open voting in legislatures; the theory that produced the former
militates even more strongly against the latter.
To be sure, the principal-agent problem is not the same in the two
cases, if we see voters as agents for no one but themselves, whose only
task is to express a preference to be aggregated socially. But then it
takes a complex collective-action account to explain the ordinary legal
ban on vote-selling.' 7 On a more elevated but also more straightforward account, we may see voters as agents for all citizens, and see
elections as aggregating voters' judgments about the social good
rather than their preferences." On this view, to allow voters to sell
184 See Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, Unveiling the Vote, 20 Brit J Pol Sci 311, 328

(1990).
185 See Joseph H. Park, England's Controversy over the Secret Ballot, 46 Pol Sci Q 51, 52
(1931) (describing the history of and debate surrounding England's move to the secret ballot).
186 See Daniel Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside-Out: Intrastate Aspects of Interstate
Regulatory Competition, 14 Yale J Reg 149,168 n 72 (1996):

Consider some of the differences between a legislature and the populace: (1) Votes are cast
by secret ballots in direct democracy, not so in legislatures. So, votes can hardly be bought
and sold since there is no chance of adequate policing; (2) voters are not "repeat players" in
the sense that they interact with one another on a statewide level such that their allegiances
and behavior can be watched by others; (3) voters have no continuing oversight mechanisms to enable them to secure influence over interest groups, regulated industries or others; their only redress is an initiative that is considered at the next appropriate election.
187 See Saul Levmore, Voting with Intensity, 53 Stan L Rev 111, 122-41 (2000); Russell Hardin, Morality within the Limits of Reason 93 (Chicago 1988).
188 See Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Majorities: Rousseau Revisited, in John W. Chapman
and Alan Wertheimer, eds, NOMOS XXXII: Majorities and Minorities 44, 59 (NYU 1990)
("People often vote on the basis of what they think is the general good of society."); Bernard
Grofman and Scott L. Feld, Rousseau's GeneralWill: A Condorcetian Perspective,82 Am Pol Sci
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their judgments to third parties inflicts the same type of agency cost
on society that legislative vote-selling inflicts on the electorate. This
view straightforwardly justifies both the ban on explicit vote-selling
and the accompanying practice of the secret ballot.
The upshot of these points is that open voting has cross-cutting or
ambiguous effects on voters' control of their legislative agents. On one
hand, a switch from secret to open voting reduces agency costs by reducing voters' costs of monitoring their legislative agents. On the
other hand, a switch from secret to open voting also creates an agency
cost by creating an open market for legislative votes, allowing interest
groups to divert legislators from voters' goals. These two variables
move in opposite directions, so the institutional-design question is
how the two costs net out. The question is empirical, not a priori, so if
our task is to evaluate Article I's mandate for public roll call voting
from the standpoint of normative institutional design, we should take
comfort in the fact that open voting is ubiquitous in the representative
assemblies of liberal democracies, often by constitutional prescription.
If there is even a weak tendency for institutions, specifically constitutions, to evolve toward rules that minimize agency costs, we should infer from this strong uniformity that the loss of information to voters
produced by secrecy outweighs the agency costs produced by an open
market in legislative votes.
This is not to say, however, that we should uncritically approve of
the roll call provisions in the Journal Clause. If the empirical regularity of open voting in legislatures suggests that the Clause does not go
too far, we might believe, on precisely the same grounds, that the
Clause does not go far enough. Although the constitutional text provides for roll call voting on "any question," early interpretations settled that the rule extends only to final votes on enactments, not to voting in standing or ad hoc committees, not even the Committee of the
Whole that the House uses to process amendments."" Many state and
foreign constitutions, however, mandate (or permit a small minority to
require) roll call voting in committee as well as on floor passage. 1
Rev 567, 567 (1988) ("[W]hen citizens strive to identify the common good and vote in accordance with their perceptions of it, the vote of the Assembly of the People can be taken to be the
most reliable means for ascertaining the common good.").
189 See Walter J.Oleszek, House Voting Procedures:Forms and Requirements 2, CRS Report
98-228 GOV (updated Feb 20, 2001) (noting that under House Rule XVIII, in the Committee of
the Whole, one can obtain a roll call vote only when the quorum is one hundred members of the
committee and twenty-five of those members agree to the roll call vote).
190See, for example, Ark Const Art IV, § 12 ("[Tlhe yeas and nays on any question shall, at
the desire of any five members, be entered on the journals."); Fla Const Art III, § 4(c) ("[U]pon
the request of five members present, the vote of each member voting on any question shall be
entered on the journal."); Ga Const Art III, § 5.6 ("In either house, when ordered by the presiding officer or at the desire of one-fifth of the members present or a lesser number if so provided
by the rules of either house, a roll-call vote on any question shall be taken and shall be entered
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Given the major nineteenth-century shift that made congressional
committees, rather than the floor, the dominant locus of legislative
dealmaking, we might wish ex post that the federal Constitution had
indisputably provided the same thing. More recent Congresses have
attained the same result by voluntary rulemaking, but instead of taking this to suggest that an updated interpretation of the Journal
Clause is unnecessary, we might equally take it to suggest that an updated interpretation would not prove unduly disruptive. On both textual and functional grounds, then, the prevailing interpretation of Article I's roll call provisions is underinclusive; Congress should recognize a constitutional, not merely self-imposed, obligation to reinterpret the Journal Clause to cover voting in all legislative fora.
c) Mandatory roll call voting. A striking characteristic of many

state constitutions is that they mandate roll calls-in contrast to roll
calls that, as with the Journal Clause, must be triggered by a set fraction of legislators. State constitutions often require roll call voting for
the final passage of any bill'' and for supermajority votes.' 2 Although
by tradition the Senate always uses roll calls to vote on treaties, the

Constitution expressly mandates roll calls in one case only: where the
houses vote by two-thirds supermajority to override a presidential
veto. "In all such Cases," the provision runs, "the Votes of both Houses
shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons
voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each

on the journal."); Ill Const Art IV,§ 8(c) ("In the Senate at the request of two members, and in
the House at the request of five members, a record vote may be taken on any other occasion.");
Mo Const Art III, § 22 ("[T]he recorded vote of the members of the committee shall be filed
§ 19 ("Upon motion made in either house and secwith all reports on bills."); NC Const Art I1,
onded by one fifth of the members present, the yeas and nays upon any question shall be
taken."); Wis Const Art IV,§ 20 ("The yeas and nays of the members of either house on any
question shall, at the request of one-sixth of those present, be entered on the journal.").
§ 14 ("The yeas and nays on final passage shall be
191 See, for example, Alaska Const Art II,
entered in the journal."); Del Const Art II, § 10 ("The names of the members voting for and
against any bill or joint resolution, except in relation to adjournment, shall on the final vote be
entered on the journal."): Ill Const Art IV, § 8(c) ("Final passage of a bill shall be by record
vote."); La Const Art Ill, § 15(G) ("Final passage of a bill shall be by record vote."); Mich Const
Art IV, § 26 ("On the final passage of bills, the votes and names of the members voting thereon
shall be entered in the journal."); Minn Const Art IV. § 22 ("No law shall be passed unless voted
for by a majority of all the members elected to each house of the legislature, and the vote entered in the journal of each house."); Mont Const Art V, § 11, cl2 ("On final passage, the vote
shall be taken by ayes and noes and the names entered on the journal.").
192 See, for example, Ga Const Art III, § 5, cl6 ("The yeas and nays in each house shall be
recorded and entered on the journal upon the passage or rejection of any bill or resolution appropriating money and whenever the Constitution requires a vote of two-thirds of either or both
§§ 10, 13 (requiring record
houses for the passage of a bill or resolution."); Kan Const Art I1,
votes and a supermajority for amending the state constitution or ratifying an amendment to the
U.S. Constitution);Va Const Art IV,§§ 10, 17 (requiring a record vote and supermajority for certain proceedings, including impeachment).
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House respectively."'' 3 The difference between mandates and trigger
provisions at first seems less than dramatic, at least where the fraction
needed to trigger a roll call is as small as the Journal Clause's onefifth, but the striking consequence of such provisions is that even
unanimous consent cannot dispense with the need for a roll call,
something that is very rare for constitutional transparency rules.
On the account offered here, it is straightforward to evaluate the
marginal effect of such provisions, over and above the baseline roll
call rules. The mandate for roll call voting increases the information
available to citizens about legislators' behavior on the most consequential votes: those involving final passage and the extraordinary circumstances in which supermajority voting is required. Because the
stakes are so high in such situations, it might be a plausible concern
that even legislators who otherwise compete to offer transparency to
constituents would develop mechanisms to overcome their collectiveaction problems and collude to prevent the roll call procedure from
being triggered. Alternatively (although this point is compatible with
the last one), it might be thought that citizen-principals should most
suspect that their legislator-agents have fallen prey to deliberative pathologies, or are engaging in self-dealing, precisely when those agents
are unanimous, or sufficiently near unanimous that even the small
number of votes needed to trigger a roll call cannot be found. The
ambiguity of unanimity is always with us. Unanimity might suggest,
along the lines suggested by the Condorcet jury theorem, that there is
a right answer and everyone has figured it out. It might also suggest
that a legislative mob is stampeding toward a dubious policy, or that
a legislative gang has passed out sufficient side payments to all
participants.
The flip side of the coin, of course, is that the mandated transparency also enhances the monitoring of bargains between legislators and
other actors. The mandated roll call on veto override votes probably
enhances presidential power on net by permitting the president to
strike marginally more enforceable bargains in anticipation of veto
showdowns, and this might or might not be thought positive taken by
itself. But the magnitude of this effect is probably rather small, and the
193 US Const Art I,§ 7, cl2.The literal-minded will note that this provision appears to draw
a distinction between "yea and nay" votes, on the one hand, and votes that match the yeas and
nays with the names of particular legislators, on the other-perhaps suggesting that the "yea and
nay" voting required by the Journal Clause requires only a formal count of those supporting and
those opposed (in contrast to methods like voice voting and division voting, which allow the
speaker or presiding officer to judge the result based on an imprecise estimate of which side has
the majority). In congressional tradition, however, this distinction has never been drawn: roll call
voting always matches votes with names. See Oleszek, House Voting Procedures at 2 (cited in
note 189); Tiefer, Congressional Practice at 536-37 (cited in note 71) (noting that during a roll
call vote, each senator's name and vote is recorded individually).
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widespread and consistent use of roll call mandates by state constitutions suggests that the background evolutionary or institutional pressure to monitor supermajority votes and final-passage votes more
closely than other votes ought to be deemed more important than a
loss of legislative autonomy that is marginal in both the colloquial and
formal senses. By the same logic, however, the Journal Clause can be
criticized yet again as being too narrow: a mandated roll call vote on
all bills up for final passage would incorporate what is plausibly a
valuable state-level innovation.
6. The Origination Clause.
The Origination Clause provides that "[a]ll Bills for raising
Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.""' The
Clause presents a variety of important historical issues. We have seen
that the Convention was riven by struggles over the Clause, a question
intertwined with the all-important question of the basis of representation in the Senate. The principal rationale for origination restrictions
was typically that the upper house, where hereditary (as in England)
or elected on a geographic rather than proportional basis (as in the
Senate) was remote from or unrepresentative of "the people," a rationale that would disappear if the Senate were elected on a proportional basis. Accordingly Pinckney initially proclaimed the question of
the Origination Clause "premature[:] If the Senate [should] be formed
on the same proportional representation as it stands at present, they
[should] have equal power [that is, to originate money bills]; otherwise
if a different principle [should] be introduced.' '.. After much maneuvering, the Clause was inserted as compensation to large states in consideration for their acquiescence in the state-based, rather than proportional, composition of the Senate. I shall not explore this background in any more detail,' 6 however, as my project is not to trace the
provenance of the constitutional law of congressional procedure, but
to evaluate it prescriptively.
In the origination setting, the framers faced a superficially simple
menu of design choices: to have no origination restriction, to create a
category of bills subject to exclusive House origination with no Senate
amendments permitted (remitting to the Senate for an up-or-down
vote), or to make House origination exclusive while permitting Senate
amendments. The no-amendment regime roughly describes the tradi194 US Const Art 1. § 7,cl 1.
195 Farrand, ed, 1 Federal Convention at 234 (cited in note 30).
196 For a full account, see I. Michael Medina, The Origination Clause in the American Constitution: A Comparative Survey, 23 Tulsa L J 165 (1987).
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tional practice of Parliament, in which the Lords were not permitted
to amend fiscal measures originating in the Commons, while the regime permitting amendments had been adopted in several state constitutions. '9 The framers were divided on the question of whether the
various possible versions of the Origination Clause would have any effects at all, and if so what those effects would be. I shall suggest that,
contrary to conventional wisdom, the Clause indeed has effects, and
that they are largely beneficial from Congress's point of view-so
much so that exclusive privileges of origination tend to evolve
endogenously. The best criticism of the Clause, then, is not that it is ineffectual or a nullity, but instead that (putting aside the need to make
the proposed Constitution acceptable to the ratifiers) it was unnecessary for the Convention to constitutionalize the Clause; a similar norm
might well have evolved in its absence.
More than a few framers argued that the third option, an origination clause with Senate amendment power, would have no effect at all.
James Wilson put the argument metaphorically:
With regard to the pursestrings, it was to be observed that the
purse was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of
the H[ouse] of Rep[resentatives] the other in those of the Senate.
Both houses must concur in untying, and of what importance
could it be which untied first, which last.9
The proposal that Wilson was addressing would have required
House origination of both revenue bills and appropriations bills, while
the enacted version of the Clause limits the restriction to revenue bills
alone, so the metaphor of pursestrings may be slightly misleading; I
shall take up the question of appropriations bills below. Nonetheless
Wilson's basic point is an important one. The Senate can, and not infrequently has, simply stricken out the whole substance of a bill enacted by the House and inserted its own proposal (as an "amendment"). The resulting bill, if approved by the subsequent conference
committee, will have nominally originated in the House, but will in
substance have originated in the Senate; ' " indeed some major tax197 See, for example, Mass Const of 1780 Ch I,§ 3,Art VII ("All money bills shall originate
in the house of representatives: but the senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on
other bills."); Del Const of 1776 Art VI ("All money-bills for the support of government shall
originate in the house of assembly, and may be altered, amended, or rejected by the legislative
council.").
198Farrand, ed,2 FederalConvention at 275 (cited in note 19).
I" Senators may be the true authors of revenue bills even if the Senate does not substitute
its "amendment" for the House's bill. This point is emphasized by the important institutional detail that most current tax legislation is reviewed by the expert staff of the standing Joint Committee on Taxation before funneling through House Ways and Means or the Senate Finance Committee. See Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of the Joint Committee on Taxation, online at http://www.house.gov/jct/rolehist.htm (visited Feb 20, 2004) (explaining the Com-
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reform legislation, such as the reworking of the tax code in 1986, has
just this provenance." So either origination regime-the one barring
amendments and the one permitting them-in effect allows the Senate to make counteroffers, and it is unclear in what respect the
House's exclusive power to originate revenue bills makes any
difference.2 "'"
But this argument is overblown. Even where counteroffers are
permitted, in the form of de jure or de facto amendments, standard
bargaining models suggest that the first-mover may obtain a disproportionate share of the gains. The intuition is that the first player will
benefit from his ability to make an initial offer that gives the second
player only an iota more than the second player would obtain at the
end of the sequence of offers and responses; the second player can do

no better than to accept.

To be sure, this advantage is of uncertain

magnitude, and much depends on the precise specifications of the
model. The more quickly the value of obtaining agreement later

(rather than now) declines, the greater the first-mover advantage is,
but the relative impatience of the players-the rate at which they discount future gains-is also a critical factor, "" and of course either
house may anticipate future or unrelated negotiations and thus decide

to invest in a reputation for obstinacy. Informally, however, softer considerations support the idea that the House gains something from its
origination privilege. Even where the Senate enjoys amendment
power, the House might enjoy an intangible but real form of first-

mover advantage from its ability to set the policy agenda in ways that
structure both legislative and political debate. The question is empiri-

mittee's role in the tax legislative process).
2(M)1 Tax Reform Act of 1986: Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3838, HR Rep No
99-841,99th Cong, 2d Sess iii (1986).
201 An unexplored issue, tangential to the discussion in text, is the effect of the Clause on
tax-related treaties. The Clause might bar the president and Senate from creating a selfexecuting agreement with foreign nations to change revenue rules, as the Clause requires the
House to initiate the statutory changes needed to bring the treaty into force. Thanks to Julie
Roin for this point.
202 See Bruce Lyons, Bargaining, in Shaun Hargreaves Heap, et al, The Theory of Choice: A
Critical Guide 130, 136-41 (Blackwell 1992) (showing, with a sequential game theory model, how
the first-mover may gain an advantage).
203 See Avinash Dixit and Susan Skeath, Games of Strategy 531-34 (Norton 1999) (discussing an alternating-offers model in which total value decays); Lyons, Bargaining at 136, 141 (cited
in note 202).
2(4 If the players have equal discount rates, the first-mover retains an advantage. If the second-mover discounts less steeply than the first, however, that advantage may dissipate or even be
reversed, depending on the players' specified traits. See Dixit and Skeath. Games at 537-38
(cited in note 203) (discussing an alternating-offers model with impatience as a factor influencing
decisions).
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cal, and the literature suggests that there is indeed an appreciable
first-mover advantage in the legislative game.""
A related argument suggests, more broadly but equally wrongly,

that the Origination Clause is a nullity because any origination restriction can be circumvented through intercameral contracting, whether
or not the Clause permits Senate amendments. At the Convention,
Madison advanced the following argument:

Experience proved that it ["the exclusive privilege of originating
money bills"] had no effect. If seven States in the upper branch
wished a bill to be originated, they might surely find some member from some of the same States in the lower branch who would

originate it. The restriction as to amendment was of as little consequence. Amendments could be handed privately by the Senate

to members in the other house."
In modern terms, the two houses may contract around the Origination
Clause at low cost,2" in part because their repeat-play relationship has
produced elaborate institutions for intercameral bargaining (such as

conference committees and the Joint Committee on Taxation).
But this Coasean analysis ignores the distributive effect of the initial specification of constitutional entitlements. Even if the same revenue levels are produced with or without the Clause, the House's abil-

ity to demand a payment for the renunciation of its origination privilege with respect to particular bills will skew the distribution of political benefits between House and Senate in the House's favor, relative
to a world with no Origination Clause at all."v The flawed assumption
205 "[Tjhe chamber that acts first on a bill tends to have the greatest impact on the content
of a bill prior to the conference." Gerald S. Strom and Barry S. Rundquist, A Revised Theory of
Winning in House-Senate Conferences, 71 Am Pol Sci Rev 448, 450 (1977). See also Dennis S. Ippolito, House-Senate Budget Conferences: Institutional and Strategic Advantages, 11 Am Pol Q 71
(1983); Donald A. Gross, House-Senate Conference Committees: A Comparative-State Perspective,
24 Am J Pol Sci 769 (1980).
206 Farrand, ed, 1 Federal Convention at 527 (cited in note 30).
207 See Donald Wittman, The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract: A Transaction
Cost Analysis of The Federalist Papers, in Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman, The Federalist
Papers and the New Institutionalism 73,75-76 (Agathon 1989).
208 The point here is not that the outcomes in either case would be socially efficient. As one
possible source of inefficiency among many, note that the Origination Clause will, at the margin.
increase the inefficiency of redistributive measures by Congress. Under certain assumptions, it
can be shown that redistribution is more efficiently handled through taxation than through regulation. Compare Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667, 667 (1994) (arguing that income
redistribution "through legal rules offers no advantage over redistribution through the income
tax system and typically is less efficient"), with Chris W. Sanchirico, Taxes versus Legal Rules as
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J Legal Stud 797 (2000) (noting that even in
the presence of an optimally redistributive tax, legal rules should nevertheless deviate from efficiency to redistribute income where policy makers place any weight on equity, so long as all individuals are not perfectly identical in their interaction with the legal system). But if there is a cost
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underlying the argument must be that there is in effect no constitutionally specified entitlement to begin with, because there is no external mechanism for enforcing the Clause. Under the Supreme Court's
current doctrine, this assumption is simply false; the Origination
Clause is fully justiciable.""
Indeed, the best analysis of the Origination Clause's behavioral

effects flips all of these arguments on their head. Far from being ineffectual, origination restrictions of greater or lesser formality may be
predictable or inevitable, in the sense that they tend to evolve

endogenously as norms governing the behavior of bicameral legislatures. Here the basic intuition is that a lower chamber with more
members, such as the House, may obtain policy-relevant information
at lower cost than an upper chamber with fewer members, such as the
Senate. Over time, the two houses may attain an equilibrium arrangement in which the lower house specializes in information in return for
the distributive advantage of having the first move. The House receives a larger share of the larger pie, but the Senate too benefits on
net from the House's informational expertise.""

to the Senate in making a side payment to the House (to buy off its constitutional objection)
whenever the Senate wishes to redistribute by originating a revenue bill, then the Senate will
shift marginally from redistributive revenue projects to less efficient regulatory projects, and the
total output of Congress will contain more regulation and less taxation (holding constant the
overall redistribution) than in a regime with the revenue-origination rule.
209 The Supreme Court has never invalidated a statute on Origination Clause grounds. But
the Court has consistently said that the Clause is justiciable, and it has several times considered
Origination Clause challenges on the merits, in each case finding that the statute under review
was not a "Bill[] for raising revenue" within the meaning of the Clause. See, for example, United
States v Munoz-Flores, 495 US 385,387-88 (1990) (holding that a bill requiring "courts to impose
a monetary 'special assessment' on any person convicted of a federal misdemeanor" did not "violate the Origination Clause because it is not a 'Bill for raising Revenue'); Twin City Bank v Nebeker, 167 US 196, 202 (1897) (holding that a statute providing for a national currency to be issued by designated banks, secured by government bonds and financed by a tax on the notes, "is
clearly not a revenue bill which the Constitution declares must originate in the House of Representatives"). On one account, the Court has strained to deny that the challenged statutes were
revenue measures, presumably in order to avoid the difficult questions of judicial capacity that
would be posed by any effort to determine whether a bill originated in the House or Senate. See
Hubbard v Lowe, 226 F 135, 140-41 (SD NY 1915) (invalidating a federal statute under the
Origination Clause, and opining that "[the Supreme Court] sometimes required a good deal of
mental strain to demonstrate that some piece of legislation originating in a Senate was not a 'bill
for raising revenue"'). Part of the historical picture, however, was the possibility that the enrolled-bill rule of Marshall Field & Co v Clark, 143 US 649 (1892), might bar the Court from
looking behind Congress's formal certification of a bill's house of origin. Id at 672 (holding that
official signatures on the enrolled bill are sufficient evidence that a bill passed Congress, even "if
the journal of either house fails to show that it passed in the precise form in which it was
signed"). The Court clearly limited the enrolled-bill rule in Munoz-Flores, saying that the rule
does not apply when "a constitutional provision is implicated." 495 US at 391-92 n 4.
210 See Rogers, 42 Am J Pol Sci at 1025 (cited in note 8) ("Under specified conditions, bicameral chambers sequence themselves to take advantage of one chamber's informational expertise.").

2004]

The ConstitutionalLaw of CongressionalProcedure

Obviously many other variables and forces may vitiate or drown
out this effect; it is at its strongest when the two houses are dominated
by the same political party (and thus have similar preferences). But
the quasi-constitutional traditions surrounding appropriations legislation confirm the general model. The Convention, as we have seen, rejected a proposal to include appropriations measures in the Origination Clause."' Nonetheless, a longstanding norm has evolved within
Congress to the effect that the House has the exclusive prerogative of
initiating appropriations measures.22 Much about this norm is contested, and its scope and weight are uncertain; the Senate takes it to be
a subconstitutional "custom" rather than a tradition of constitutional
stature; the House insists that the "immemorial practice" has been
constitutionalized by prescription.2 ' But the norm's perseverance in
the face of uncertainty about its precise constitutional status testifies
to the persistent benefits of cameral specialization.
The upshot, then, is that origination privilegc ,may often evolve
endogenously. While this point undermines the claim that origination
restrictions are ineffectual, it does suggest a different criticism of the
Clause: it may have been unnecessary to constitutionalize the revenue-origination privilege in the first place. The large states, such as
North Carolina, that demanded the Origination Clause as compensation for accepting an equal basis of representation in the Senate '
might have been better off with a different form of side-payment. To
be sure, in hindsight, the social harm of the Convention's normatively
questionable decision to constitutionalize the Clause has been quite
small. In this sense the Clause's critics are pointed in the right direction, albeit for the wrong reasons.
7. Cameral autonomy and congressional rulemaking.
May Congress enact an ordinary statute, presented to the president, that prescribes binding internal rules for the houses of Congress
acting separately? An internal rule means, as always, a rule that could
otherwise have been enacted by the houses alone under the Rules of
Proceedings Clause. A notable and little-explored feature of the public-law landscape is the prevalence of statutory law that bears on internal congressional procedure. Consider the Alaska Natural Gas

See note 198 and accompanying text.
James V. Saturno. The Origination Clause of the US Constitution: Interpretation and Enforcement 13, CRS Report RL31399 (May 10, 2002).
213 See Medina, 23 Tulsa LJ at 186 n 126 (cited in note 196).
214 See, for example, Farrand, ed, 2 Federal Convention at 233 (cited in note 19) (reporting
Williamson's remonstrance that North Carolina "had agreed to an equality in the Senate. merely
in consideration that money bills should be confined to the other House").
211
212
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Transportation Act,2 ' which barred consideration by either house of
Congress of certain resolutions concerning energy policy, or the recent
Congressional Review Act,2 which establishes special internal legislative procedures for disapproving proposed agency regulations.
Critically, however, Congress often inserts a proviso that subjects
the statute to override by a subsequent internal legislative rule of either house in the ordinary course."7 These qualifiers create a positive
puzzle. Rule-prescribing statutes that contain such provisos are essentially hortatory or directory; they have no legal effect on the ruleprescribing power of the houses. Why then does Congress enact the
underlying statute in the first place? An obvious possibility is that the
statute serves a coordinating function between the two houses, announcing focal points (such as numerical deadlines) so that legislators
from one house may shape their behavior in conjunction with legislators from the other. Yet the aim of coordination could be equally well
served by a concurrent resolution, not presented to the president. Why
use the ordinary statutory form, exposing internal congressional business to executive involvement and a potential veto?
A more plausible conjecture is simply that the procedural alternative to such statutes is unappealing.26 Instead of enacting a statute
that contains both substantive policy directives and (hortatory) internal rules, Congress might split the substantive questions from the procedural ones, enacting the former in the ordinary manner and enacting
the latter through each house's separate rule-making process. Such a
course of action, however, requires at least two votes (in each house)
rather than one, and thus creates more opportunities for strategic behavior. By bundling substantive with procedural provisions, the ruleprescribing statute achieves the effect of an omnibus bill, allowing enforceable deals to be struck where the alternative of sequential voting
would permit defection in later votes. Moreover, in both the House
and Senate, mid-session rule changes are difficult to accomplish; by
tacking what is in effect a rule change to a statute already under consideration, each house conserves agenda time and minimizes decision
costs.

2W5 15 USC § 719f(d) (2000). See also Metzenbaum v Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 675 F2d 1282, 1284 (DC Cir 1982) (holding that alleged violations of the Act's procedural
requirements are nonjusticiable).
216 5 USc § 801 et seq (2000).
217 See, for example, 5 USC § 802(g)(2):

This section is enacted by Congress ...with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any
time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that
House.
218 Thanks to Elizabeth Garrett for this conjecture.
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As to the normative questions: the first task is to set the constitutional baseline. Are genuine rule-prescribing statutes, lacking the typical proviso, valid or invalid under the current Constitution rightly understood? An example is the Electoral Count Act, which "puts strict
time limits on the electoral count: when the two Houses separate to
debate an objection to an electoral vote, each Member of each House
may only speak once on the objection for a maximum of five minutes,
and total debate in each House is 'limited to two hours."2' Here, in
contrast to statutes whose prescription of internal rules is merely hortatory, the positive value of the enactment is easy to understand.
First, the power to make binding rules in advance of particular
controversies allows legislators to proceed as though behind a veil of
ignorance, or uncertainty, and thus helps to ensure the impartiality of
the resulting rules. The procedures mandated by the Electoral Count
Act fit this picture nicely; it is much better to settle the management
of contested presidential elections before competing parties and factions know who the candidates will be. In any event, where binding
statutory prescription of internal rules is impossible, rules are always
subject to ex post adjustment when the substantive valence of the
rules has become apparent.
A second positive value of rule-prescribing statutes is that they
entrench procedural rules as against future houses, which may be of
potential value to both the enacting Congress and later Congresses.
Entrenchment permits credible commitments to be made, both among
legislators and between legislators and outside actors, such as the executive, constituents, or foreign nations, in situations where a nonentrenched rule would be exposed to subsequent opportunistic
change by one party to the deal. By making commitment possible, entrenchment allows all concerned to strike a range of bargains that are
otherwise unattainable. On this view, the constitutional authority for
the rule-prescribing component of these statutes is, simply, whatever
substantive legislative power authorizes the statute, in conjunction
with the Necessary and Proper Clause. 2
One constitutional objection to such statutes is the hoary antientrenchment maxim that one legislature may not bind its succes-

219 Vasan Kesavan. Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?. 80 NC L Rev 1653. 1719
(2001) (concluding that this provision violates the Rules of Proceedings Clause).
220 US Const Art I. § 8,cl18. See Steven G. Calabresi. The Political Question of Presidential
Succession, 48 Stan L Rev 155,160 n 31 (1995) ("[Tlhe Necessary and Proper Clause empowers
Congress to carry into execution its own powers. including the rule-making powers of both
Houses[:] any separate authority regarding legislative officers seems unnecessary."). See also Michel v Anderson, 14 F3d 623, 628 (DC Cir 1994) (suggesting, in dictum, that a procedural rule
created by statute would "trump any authority of the House to change its rules unilaterally to
grant that power").

The University of Chicago Law Review

[71:361

sors." ' That objection is, however, untenable, for reasons explained at
length elsewhere. ' But there are other, more formidable objections as
well. First, it is plausibly the best reading of the Rules of Proceedings
Clause that the power of each house to "determine the rules of its
proceedings" is exclusive as well as permissive; the Clause, that is, not
only authorizes internal one-house rulemaking, but also bars internal
rulemaking through other instruments. (Note that this objection is entirely distinct from the anti-entrenchment objection; the latter concerns the legal authority of houses over time, while the former addresses the question of which legal instruments - rulemaking alone, or
both rules and statutes-a given house can use to make internal
rules.) On this view, the claim that the "Necessary and Proper Clause
empowers Congress to carry into execution its own powers, including
the rule-making powers of both Houses ''... is mistaken; the rulemaking powers of the houses taken separately are not powers of Congress as a joint body, and thus cannot be exercised by statute. A second important objection sounds in the separation of powers; quite
apart from the Rules of Proceedings Clause, it might be said that
presidential involvement in Congress's internal rulemaking poses an
unacceptable risk of executive invasion of core legislative functions.
Accordingly, Congress might be able to enact rules by concurrent
resolution,22 but not by statutes subject to presentment.
If statutes that prescribe binding internal rules are unconstitutional, is this good constitutional design? Probably not. In these settings the Constitution deprives Congress of its first-choice instrument,
thereby imposing discernible costs for uncertain benefits. The costs
arising from the inability of earlier Congresses to commit to future
rules behind the veil of ignorance are the forgone bargains made possible by entrenching instruments that codify binding commitments.
The benefits of prohibiting Congress from seizing such opportunities
are obscure. The bare insistence on cameral autonomy-that each
house simply must make rules to govern itself and itself alone-just
restates the conclusion, rather than explaining it. After all, an instrument that prescribes binding internal rules is simply another policy
tool at Congress's disposal. It is hard to see, in general, why such an instrument should be thought any more dangerous, or more susceptible
221 See, for example, United States v Winstar Corp, 518 US 839,872 (1996) (stating that "one
legislature may not bind the legislative authority of its successors").
222 See generally Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J 1665 (cited in note 140). For a contrary
view, see John 0. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 Va L Rev 385 (2003).
223 Calabresi.48 Stan L Rev at 160 n 31 (cited in note 220).
224 The Kansas Constitution creates such a mechanism: it allows the two legislative houses
to adopt joint rules on certain matters, and to provide the "manner" in which those rules may be
changed in the future. Kan Const Art II, § 8.
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to abuse, than a myriad of other instruments that Congress uses routinely, such as the many varieties of taxation, spending, and delegation.
The structural problem of presidential encroachment, if it is one,
might be obviated by providing a constitutional mechanism for binding concurrent resolutions in areas also subject to the Rules of Proceedings Clause. All in all, it is a flaw in the current Constitution that
bars Congress as an institution from prescribing internal rules binding
on the houses taken separately.
8. "Missing" provisions.
Finally, I shall briefly analyze some legislative-procedure rules
that might, with the benefit of two centuries of hindsight, be described
as "missing" from the federal Constitution. These are provisions that
have, since the founding era, come into wide use in other jurisdictions'
constitutions. I shall make no attempt at a comprehensive survey of
the terrain, nor shall I discuss important state constitutional innovations that are substantive rather than procedural in my sense. Examples in this last category are single-subject rules, which typically prohibit enactments that contain unrelated provisions,"2 ' and prohibitions
on special or local bills, which bar enactments for the benefit of geographically or socially confined interests, as opposed to the public interest.2" In both cases, the prohibitions look to the enactment's content
and substance, ruling out certain legislative outcomes, rather than addressing the mode of the bill's enactment; in this respect they are
closely analogous to the federal Equal Protection Clause. The examples I shall discuss here, by contrast, are genuinely procedural, in that
a bill of given content may either satisfy or violate them in light of the
history of its passage through the legislature.
a) Three-reading rules. A striking feature of the legislative
procedure mandated by state and foreign constitutions is the prevalence of "three-reading rules." Such rules typically require that no bill
shall "become a law unless the same shall have been read on three
2 - In
several days in each house previous to the final vote thereon."most jurisdictions, however, the three-reading requirement may be
225 See, for example, Ill Const Art IV, § 8(d) ("Bills, except bills for appropriations and for
the codification, revision or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject.").
226 See, for example, NY Const Art III. § 17 ("The legislature shall not pass a private or local bill.").
227 Idaho Const Art III, § 15. For other state constitutional provisions, see Ala Const Art IV
§ 63 ("Every bill shall be read on three different days in each house."); Colo Const Art V, § 22
("Every bill shall be read by title when introduced, and at length on two different days in each
house."): Ind Const Art IV, § 18 ("Every bill shall be read, by title, on three several days. in each
House."): SC Const Art III. § 18 ("No Bill or Joint Resolution shall have the force of law until it
shall have been read three times and on three several days in each house."). For foreign constitutional provisions see France Const Art 45 (requiring two readings of the bill).
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overridden by a supermajority vote, at least in cases of "urgency. '22 . In
the national Congress, each house early adopted three-reading rules;
although the Senate rules still in effect require three readings on three
different days, the House rules currently allow a bill to be read three
times and enacted all in a single legislative day.22'
Bentham's argument for three-reading rules, which is the standard argument, illustrates their justifications and their characteristic
problems. Bentham argues, chiefly, that the three-reading rule operates as a self-binding mechanism that allows the legislature to guard
against the consequences of its own future passions, myopia, or herd
behavior. By requiring that bills be read and debated on successive
days, the legislature may anticipate and forestall future occasions on
which it will be seized by deliberative pathologies. "The more susceptible a people are of excitement and being led astray, so much the
more ought they to place themselves under the protection of forms
which impose the necessity of reflection, and prevent surprises."2"
Bentham was aware of the most obvious counterargument: delay,
reflection, and deliberation amount to inaction, and inaction produces
opportunity costs. By preventing legislators from acting in a passionate frenzy, the three-reading requirement minimizes the risk of false
positives -occasions when the legislature should not have acted but
did. Yet the requirement also increases the risk of false negativesoccasions when the legislature should have acted expeditiously, yet,
stewing in its own deliberative maturity, failed to do so. Bentham responds as follows:
It may be objected, that this plan [the three-reading requirement]
occasions great delays, and that circumstances may imperiously
require that a law should be passed with rapidity. To this it may
be replied, that in cases of necessity the Houses of Parliament

228 See, for example. Alaska Const Art 11,§ 14 ("[A]ny bill may be advanced from second to
third reading on the same day by concurrence of three-fourths of the house considering it."):
Colo Const Art V. § 22 ("[Alny reading at length may be dispensed with upon unanimous consent of the members present."); Fla Const Art III. § 7 (requiring three readings unless the "rule is
waived by two-thirds vote"); Md Const Art III, § 27(a) (requiring three readings unless "twothirds of the members elected to the House where such bill is pending determine by yeas and
nays"); Or Const Art IV. § 19 (requiring three readings "unless in case of emergency two-thirds
of the house where such bill may be pending shall, by a vote of yeas and nays, deem it expedient
to dispense with this rule"); W Va Const Art VI. § 29 (requiring three readings, "unless in case of
urgency, by a vote of four fifths of the members present, taken by yeas and nays on each bill. this
rule be dispensed with").
229 House Rule XVI. cl 8 (omitting from the three-reading rule the requirement that each
reading occur on a different day): Senate Rule XIV. cl 2 (specifying that the readings "shall be on
three different legislative days").
230 Bentham, Political Tactics ch XI, § 3 at 131 (cited in note 11).
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can suspend their usual orders, and that a bill may be made to

pass through all its stages in both houses in one day.2"
But this view collapses under its own weight unless the three-reading
rule is entrenched, perhaps by constitutionalization. Without entrenchment, the very same decisionmaking pathologies that produce
hasty and ill-considered substantive legislation will produce hasty and
ill-considered suspensions of the three-reading rule. Bentham has
overlooked that nonentrenched procedural rules are endogenous

products of the legislature, and are thus subject to the control of the
same majorities that Bentham seeks to restrain."'
So the key design problem here is that three-reading rules must

be constitutionalized or otherwise entrenched to achieve their intended effects. The necessary entrenchment of three-reading requirements might be constitutional or cameral, and, if it is cameral, either
formal or informal. In many states, as we have seen, three-reading re-

quirements are formally entrenched in the constitution. In the Senate
the requirement is cameral only, but it is also formal. A motion to
change or suspend the Senate rules, including the three-reading rule, is

subject to filibuster and thus requires sixty votes to attain cloture; the
cloture rule is itself formally entrenched.' (Here the Senate is using a
supermajority rule to protect its ordinary processes; I shall return to
the relationship between three-reading rules and supermajority rules

momentarily.) In the House, however, the barriers are more porous.
We have seen that the current House rules allow all required readings
to occur in a single day, and even the requirement of three readings
can itself be waived. Although there is an appreciable de facto cost to

changing the House rules after their biannual re-adoption at the beginning of a new Congress, no formal barrier prevents intrasession
rule changes or, more commonly, suspensions by simple majority. 4 We
231
232

Id at 130-31.
In a different passage, however, Bentham makes the very argument I have given in the

text:
It is true, that in a single assembly, rules may be established which prescribe multiple examinations ....[B]ut a single assembly may have the best rules, and disregard them when it
pleases. Experience proves that it is easy to lay them aside: and urgency of circumstances
always furnishes a ready pretext, and a popular pretext, for doing what the dominant party
desires.
Id ch I,§ 5 at 26. Bentham's institutional solution is bicameralism: "If there are two assemblies,
the forms will be observed: because if one violates them. it affords a legitimate reason to the
other for rejection of everything presented to it after such suspicious innovation." Id.
233 See Posner and Vermeule, 111 Yale L J at 1694-95 (cited in note 140) (describing the entrenchment of the cloture rule through the interrelation of Senate Rules V and XXII).
2-4 Enactment of a bill using the suspension procedures of House Rule XV does require a
two-thirds vote. See House Rule XV. § 1(a) ("A rule may not be suspended except by a vote of
two-thirds of the Members voting, a quorum being present."). However, "[i]f a suspension motion fails to receive the required two-thirds vote, the House can consider the bill in question
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might, then, plausibly see it as a defect in the federal constitutional
law of legislative procedure that it failed to codify and entrench the
three-reading requirement, a device that was well known to the framers from parliamentary practice, and that they in fact adopted, in
slightly diluted form, to govern the business of the Convention itself.'
The entrenchment of three-reading requirements, however, reanimates the concern that deliberative delay will produce costly inaction. Most states have sensibly attempted to maximize the net benefits
of three-reading requirements through design devices that sort occasions for swift action, on the one hand, from legislative frenzies, on the
other. A common technique is to use supermajority requirements,
sometimes combined with a substantive trigger that permits the supermajority to override only in case of "emergency" or "urgency." It is
tempting to condemn such provisions on the ground that supermajority rules allow legislative minorities to hold out for side payments, and
that the existence of an emergency will exacerbate this concern, forcing the legislative majority to acquiesce in the minority's extortionate
demands. Yet a holdout threat will not be credible under such circumstances.3' If a genuine emergency is at hand so that the result of inaction will be worse for all concerned-including the minority-than
will passage of the necessary legislation without side payments, then
the minority can do no better than to acquiesce. The majority, knowing
this, will ignore the minority's demands entirely, and the necessary supermajority will support the bill even without payments.
b) Temporal restrictions on proposed legislation. In the na-

tional House and Senate, bills may be introduced at any time during
the legislative session; the Constitution contains no restrictions on this
practice. Many state constitutions, by contrast, restrict the period during which bills may be introduced, typically by counting either forward
or backward from the beginning or end of the session. The Washington Constitution, for example, prescribes that "[n]o bill shall be considered in either house unless the time of its introduction shall have
again and under procedures that require only a simple majority vote to pass it." Stanley Bach,
Suspension of the Rules in the House: Principal Features 2, CRS Report 98-314 GOV (updated
Jan 25, 2001).
235 Farrand, ed, 1 Federal Convention at 9 (cited in note 30):
A Writing, which contains any matter brought on to be considered, shall be read once
throughout, for information, then by paragraphs, to be debated, and again, with the
amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and afterwards the question shall be put
upon the whole, amended, or approved in [its] original form, as the case shall be.
See also Robert Luce, Legislative Procedure: Parliamentary Practices and the Course of Business
in the Framing of Statutes 204-11 (Riverside 1922) (detailing the evolution of multiple-reading
requirements).
236 See Elster. 2 U Pa J Const L at 383-84 (cited in note 14) (making a similar point about
the Origination Clause).
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been at least ten days before the final adjournment of the legislature, 2 . subject to a supermajority override. The Missouri Constitution
bars nonappropriations bills from being introduced "after the sixtieth
legislative day,"" subject to an override by simple majority. In some
states the class of legislation subject to timing requirements is more
narrow-appropriations bills, or bills relating to official salaries-but
most states that have timing restrictions parallel Washington by permitting a supermajority override.
Here, as with the case of three-reading requirements, I shall suggest that the absence of a similar provision from the federal Constitution is cause for regret. The point of such provisions is straightforward.
Timing limitations, whether of the forward or backward variety, protect the end of the legislative session from overcrowding, and with
good reason. First, the multiple delays built into the structure of legislative procedure routinely create a press of business at the end of the
legislative session. By creating a period during which no new business
can be added while old business is being processed, timing limitations
help to minimize the costs of legislatures' complex internal structure.
Second, timing limitations reduce the likelihood that ill-considered or
technically maladroit measures will pass during the end-of-session
flurry, measures that might not obtain majority approval in calmer
moments. Finally, in many states timing provisions were enacted as
progressive reforms in response to episodes in which legislatures finished the session with a flurry of quasi-corrupt (or simply corrupt)
spending legislation or special bills. The massive volume of business
that always marks the end of legislative sessions increases the costs to
other legislators and outside groups of monitoring and blocking such
legislation; timing limitations create a buffer period in which public
outrage may be mobilized, permitting the most inefficient legislation
to be repealed or reversed in the current session. Without timing limitations, legislators may hope to weather the political storm after the
legislature has recessed and public attention has receded.
To be sure, some of the relevant problems might be dampened by
more-precisely targeted provisions, such as constitutional restrictions
on special-interest legislation. But the sponginess of such provisions,
resulting from the notorious difficulty of identifying special-interest
measures or even understanding the "public interest" at a conceptual
level, means that a quantified rule such as a timing restriction is easier
to enforce, and thus a valuable prophylactic device.
Another stock objection to timing restrictions is the possibility of
circumvention. In most states the relevant provisions are held not to

237
238

Wash Const Art II, § 36.
Mo Const Art III, § 25.
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bar amendments offered outside the permissible window for introduction, so that legislatures have sometimes introduced "skeleton" bills
within the window and then tacked on sweeping amendments. But
this, like the gambit of thoroughgoing amendments that the Senate
occasionally uses to circumvent the Origination Clause, presents an
ordinary form-and-substance problem. Officials charged with enforcing constitutional rules must constantly resolve similar questions; the
threat of circumvention is rarely thought such an insuperable problem
as to condemn the underlying rules entirely. Note that this point does
not assume that judges are the ones enforcing the provision, so the
point holds even in jurisdictions where the enrolled-bill rule prevents
judges from examining the timing of the bill's introduction to check
compliance with the restriction. Legislatures vigorously enforce many
such restrictions, as we also saw in the Origination Clause setting. In
general, it is a mistake to assume that constitutional prohibitions are
somehow unreal unless backed up by judicial review, although it is a
mistake that routinely seduces court-centered constitutional lawyers.
In both the case of three-reading requirements and the case of
timing restrictions, then, other jurisdictions have pioneered innovations in the constitutional law of congressional procedure that the
federal Constitution would do well to imitate. That it has not done so
is a special case of a more general problem: the higher cost of federal
constitutional amendment works for both good and, in this case, ill, by
creating a status quo bias that blocks both misguided experiments and
valuable innovations. But it is not far-fetched to imagine that a political coalition might arise to support procedural requirements whose
substantive political valence is, as in these cases, uncertain ex ante;
many constitutional amendments, especially in the modern era, have
just this procedural and structural character.: ' So it is a plausible recommendation, or aspiration, that the constitutional law of congressional procedure should be supplemented in these respects.
CONCLUSION

In the framers' view, and in ours, the constitutional law of congressional procedure should accomplish a range of laudable aims. The
relevant rules should promote well-informed and cognitively undistorted legislative deliberation, ameliorate the principal-agent problems inherent in legislative representation, and make technically efficient use of the legislature's resources, especially its compressed
239 See. for example. US Const Amend XX (addressing congressional terms and presidential succession), US Const Amend XXII (addressing presidential term limits). US Const Amend
XXV (addressing presidential succession): US Const Amend XXVII (addressing legislative compensation).
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agenda space. Unfortunately these aims cannot all be simultaneously
attained in full, as the framers were well aware. The framers' eventual
choices aimed to optimize the inevitable tradeoffs between and
among these goods, alleviating legislative pathologies without cramping the self-governance of future legislative institutions. Yet there is no
guarantee that their instrumental choices were successful ones, and I
have refused to take it on faith that they were. Centuries of subsequent experimentation and innovation in Congress and in state and
foreign constitutions provide rich resources with which to evaluate
and improve the Constitution's fundamental provisions that structure
the legislative process.

